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Abstract
This Article addresses the questions left unanswered by the Supreme
Court’s recent exclusionary rule cases. The Hudson-Herring-Davis
trilogy presents a new and largely unexamined doctrinal landscape for
Fourth Amendment suppression hearings. Courts, litigators, and
scholars are only now assessing what has changed on the ground in trial
practice. Once an automatic remedy for any constitutional violation, the
exclusionary rule now necessitates a separate and more searching
analysis. Rights and remedies have been decoupled, such that a clear
Fourth Amendment constitutional violation may not lead to the
exclusion of evidence. Instead, it now leads to an examination of the
conduct of the law enforcement officer—conduct that if not sufficiently
“culpable” does not require exclusion. This Article analyzes the
doctrinal moves of a Supreme Court focused on constitutional
culpability and raises questions about the evolving doctrine’s
implication for trial practice. The Article then suggests several
responses for lawyers and courts approaching this new reality.
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[I]f the Court means what it now says, if it would place
determinative weight upon the culpability of an individual
officer’s conduct, and if it would apply the exclusionary
rule only where a Fourth Amendment violation was
“deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,” then the “good
faith” exception will swallow the exclusionary rule.1
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has recently directed a sustained legal assault
against the exclusionary rule.2 First, in Hudson v. Michigan,3 the Court
1. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2439 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2. See id. at 2423–24 (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when searches
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declared that the exclusionary rule never applies to Fourth Amendment
knock-and-announce violations.4 Then, in United States v. Herring5 and
Davis v. United States,6 the Court delivered more internally damaging
doctrinal blows, developing a new theory of exclusion based on
considerations of culpability.7 The exclusionary rule—once an
automatic remedy for constitutional violations—now requires a separate
and more searching analysis.8 Rights and remedies have been decoupled
such that a clear Fourth Amendment violation may not lead to the
exclusion of evidence.9 Instead, a clear Fourth Amendment violation
now leads to an examination of the conduct of the law enforcement
officer—conduct that does not require exclusion if it is not sufficiently
“culpable.”10 As the Supreme Court reasoned in Herring:
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully
deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is
are conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding precedent); Herring v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009) (noting that suppression is not an automatic consequence of a
Fourth Amendment violation); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (declaring that
the suppression of evidence “has always been our last resort, not our first impulse” and that the
Court has long since rejected the broad application of the exclusionary rule).
3. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599.
4. See id. at 592, 599.
5. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700–02 (discussing the underlying principles of the Court’s
precedent that serve to constrain the application of the exclusionary rule).
6. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (warning that the majority’s
approach threatens to erode the exclusionary rule).
7. David A. Moran, Hanging on by a Thread: The Exclusionary Rule (Or What’s Left of
It) Lives for Another Day, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 363, 380 (2011) (“To use a trite metaphor, the
exclusionary rule is on life support. Davis confirms that the Court will not overrule Mapp
anytime soon, but it also confirms that a solid majority of the justices have devised a strategy
that eliminates any need to formally abolish the exclusionary rule.”); see also Craig M. Bradley,
Is the Exclusionary Rule Dead?, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (2012) (“The postHerring decisions of the courts of appeals suggest that the exclusionary rule is not dead but has
been significantly limited by Herring.”).
8. Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“[A]ll evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in
a state court.”), with Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704 (“Petitioner’s claim that police negligence
automatically triggers suppression cannot be squared with the principles underlying the
exclusionary rule, as they have been explained in our cases. In light of our repeated holdings
that the deterrent effect of suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice
system . . . .”).
9. Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 463, 463 (2011) (“Although the result in Herring v. United States surprised no one, the
sweep of the Supreme Court’s opinion was breathtaking. . . . If accepted at face value . . . this
and other declarations in the Court’s opinion would mark a revolution in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Together with the Court’s restriction of civil actions, they would leave most
violations of the Fourth Amendment without a remedy.”).
10. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984)).
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worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in
our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate,
reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.11
Under this reasoning, in any suppression hearing a court must now
examine the objective culpability of actors involved to determine the
magnitude of the constitutional wrong.12 In other words, courts must
now address the constitutional blame of the wrongful government actors
before they exclude evidence recovered by those actors.
This is new territory for lawyers and courts accustomed to an
automatic linkage between constitutional wrongs and constitutional
remedies.13 Does this new focus on deliberateness mean that the
particular officer’s knowledge, intent, training, oversight, or past
constitutional errors are now relevant to suppression?14 How can
litigants prove or defend against systemic errors without extensive
discovery, expert witnesses, and mini-hearings on training and best
practices?15 Does this mean that the police officer and police
department must defend or deny their personal and professional intent
to violate a constitutional right in each suppression hearing?16 These
questions open up unexplored territory for judges seeking to understand
the Supreme Court’s new standard for exclusion and require lawyers to
make new tactical choices in suppression hearings.
This Article is written in the aftermath of what legal scholars have
recognized as a significantly disfigured exclusionary remedy.17 The
Hudson-Herring-Davis trilogy presents a new and largely unexamined
doctrinal landscape for Fourth Amendment suppression hearings.18
11. Id. at 702.
12. Id. at 701.
13. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 13 (1995) (describing how the identification of a
Fourth Amendment violation is no longer synonymous with the application of the exclusionary
rule); cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 254 (1983) (“The exclusionary rule is a remedy adopted
by this Court to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of citizens ‘to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .’ Although early
opinions suggested that the Constitution required exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence,
the exclusionary rule ‘has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.’” (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
482, 486 (1976))).
14. See infra Subsections III.B.2–4.
15. See infra Subsections III.B.6–7.
16. See infra Subsections III.B.2–3.
17. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 7, at 2; Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A
Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 757, 787 (2009); Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling For Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal
Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 727 (2011).
18. See infra Part II.
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Courts, litigators, and scholars are only now assessing what has changed
on the ground in trial practice.19 The next few years may well determine
whether the exclusionary rule, as understood since Mapp v. Ohio, still
exists, or whether it has been replaced by a much more narrow and
restrictive rule.20 The contested lines for the exclusionary rule’s future
have been drawn, but neither side has yet finalized the shape of the
remedy—a picture that will be developed only through lower court
litigation.
This Article approaches the Roberts Court’s exclusionary rule
reasoning on its own terms. It analyzes the doctrinal moves of a
Supreme Court focused on culpability and raises questions about the
evolving doctrine’s implication for trial practice. The Article then
suggests several responses for lawyers and courts approaching this new
reality. It argues that the Supreme Court failed to consider the practical
consequences of its holdings, and this failure now opens new avenues
for defense counsel to exploit an otherwise significant limitation of the
exclusionary doctrine. In addition, the most recent exclusionary rule
cases create new concerns for prosecutors who seek to rely on evidence
tainted by constitutional error.
This Article arises as part of a larger move toward “grounded
scholarship,” a developing movement to make legal scholarship more
relevant and useful for courts and practitioners.21 In response to growing
criticism that the divide between the legal academy and legal practice
has widened, this work seeks to translate constitutional theory into
practical considerations useful for lawyers and courts.22 While much

19. See supra note 17.
20. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961); LaFave, supra note 17, at 787.
21. See 2013 AALS Midyear Meeting, ASS’N. AM. L. SCH. 1, 7 (last visited Mar. 28, 2014),
http://aals.org/midyear2013/AALS_Midyear_2013.pdf (discussing a panel highlighting “The
Competitive Advantage of Grounded Scholarship” to help bridge the gap between the work of
scholars and practitioners).
22. Chief Justice John Roberts spoke about the disconnect between the legal profession
and the legal academy in a speech to the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference in June 2011,
stating: “Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, . . . and the first article is likely to
be . . . the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or
something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much
help to the bar.” Brent Newton, Scholar’s Highlight: Law Review Articles in the Eyes of the
Justices, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 30, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/04/schol
ar%E2%80%99s-highlight-law-review-articles-in-the-eyes-of-the-justices; see, e.g., Harry T.
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992); Brent E. Newton, Law Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the
Twenty-First-Century Supreme Court Justices: An Empirical Analysis, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 399,
399–400 (2012); Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: Why Law Faculties’
Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of Practical Competencies
Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 105, 113–20 (2010).
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legal scholarship is useful, relevant, and necessary for practice,23 the
shift is in the intentionality of translating legal theory into practical trial
strategies.
Part I of this Article examines the recent exclusionary rule decisions
of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts. Beginning with
Justice Antonin Scalia’s broadside against the exclusionary rule in
Hudson, and continuing with more restrained attacks in Herring and
Davis, the Supreme Court has redefined the purpose and practice of
exclusion.24 The Court has both decoupled the right from the remedy
and altered the underlying logic of the rule.
Part II questions the doctrinal consequences of this redefined
exclusionary rule. The new culpability-focused standard of exclusion
shifts the analysis to the investigating officer or police department.25
Deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent wrongdoing by that officer or
the police department will lead to suppression.26 Merely negligent
constitutional wrongdoing, however, is no longer sufficient to exclude
evidence.27 This determination of “constitutional culpability” will apply
to hundreds of thousands of police arrests and prosecutions every year.
In each suppression hearing, the court must now make a culpability
determination, which considers the actions, knowledge, training, and
intent of the participating officers.28 Part II also addresses the Court’s
language and logic as well as its adoption of legal terminology from
unrelated criminal and civil contexts. Criminal law regularly refers to
culpability with the same language the Supreme Court chose in Davis
and Herring. Deliberate, reckless, and grossly negligent (meaning
criminally negligent) are well-established legal concepts.29 Similarly,
23. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to
Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 66–67 (2006) (discussing benefits of legal theory in relation to
legal practice); Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the
Supreme Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1016–17 (2012) (finding
that the Court uses legal scholarship “rather a lot” despite claims by judges that legal
scholarship is irrelevant to the bench); David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal
Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345,
1359–64 (2011) (noting that empirical data gathered over fifty-nine years suggest an upward
trend in federal circuit court opinions citing legal scholarship, contradicting claims that there has
been a decline in the use of legal scholarship by courts).
24. See infra Part I.
25. See infra Part II.
26. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
27. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2011).
28. Part III describes what this hearing might look like.
29. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Does One Mens Rea Fit All?: Thoughts on Alexander’s
Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 955, 956–59 (2000) (discussing
the mens rea term “recklessness” and the different interpretations of the word in the criminal
law culpability hierarchy); see also infra Section II.B (discussing the term in both the civil and
criminal law context).
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civil law also differentiates between deliberate, reckless, and grossly
negligent behavior for tort liability.30 Adapting these existing culpability
standards to the exclusionary rule may provide helpful guidance to
courts addressing the issue. However, it will also alter the existing
practice for exclusionary rule litigation, opening up new, previously
forbidden avenues of inquiry in exclusionary rule determinations.
Part III examines the practical, future application of the Supreme
Court’s recent doctrinal shift. It begins by looking at the tactical choices
defense counsel and prosecutors face when required to apply the
Supreme Court’s recent rulings. From one perspective, much of the
Court’s expansive language that limits exclusion is dicta, unnecessary to
the holdings of the Court’s decisions. Defense lawyers can attempt to
avoid the consequences of the Court’s reasoning by arguing for a
limited interpretation of the cases. From another perspective, however,
the landscape has dramatically changed. Defense lawyers have new
avenues for cross-examination, expert testimony, legal argument, and
remedies based on the unintended consequences of the Supreme Court’s
decisions. Prosecutors, in turn, must defend against expanded discovery
requests and arguments that address individual and department-wide
culpability. These new avenues will place additional burdens on trial
courts, essentially adding a second level of analysis to the typical
suppression hearing.
The Conclusion predicts how courts will adapt to this new
exclusionary rule reality. While the Supreme Court did not appear to
consider the new exclusionary rule’s effect at the trial level, this Article
concludes that it will have a significant impact.
I. THE ROBERTS COURT’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOCTRINE
A new lawyer considering the exclusionary rule for the first time
would read the recent majority opinions of the Supreme Court as
holding two things: First, the exclusionary rule’s “sole purpose . . . is to
deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”31 Second, the deterrent
benefit of exclusion turns on the culpability of the officers or
department, and only when police exhibit “deliberate, reckless, or
grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights” does the
deterrent value outweigh the costs.32
30. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 483
(1992) (defining gross negligence and explaining how the term is sometimes used
interchangeably with recklessness in tort law); see also infra Section II.B (discussing the term’s
varying levels of civil law culpability).
31. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426; accord Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700
(2009).
32. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Herring, 129 S.
Ct. at 702.
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Unencumbered by history or the doctrinal currents swirling around
that language, the sweeping assertions of purpose and justification for
the rule appear forceful, if not exactly clear.33 Yet, as is the case with
most constitutional tensions, the language requires some unpacking.
This Part describes the century-long trajectory of the exclusionary rule
doctrine with a focus on the Court’s decisions under Chief Justice John
Roberts.
A. A Brief History of the Modern Exclusionary Rule
In its modern form, the exclusionary rule was first applied to federal
Fourth Amendment violations in the 1914 case Weeks v. United
States.34 In 1961, the Supreme Court applied the rule to state action
through the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio.35 While some
commentators have located exclusion as a remedy in cases from the
Founding era,36 most jurists and scholars understand the exclusionary
rule to be a judicially created response to unconstitutional action.37 For
decades following Mapp, the Supreme Court approached the
exclusionary rule as a necessary and constitutionally connected remedy
for a constitutional wrong.38 Until Hudson v. Michigan, Supreme Court
opinions assumed with little difficulty an intrinsic link between the
exclusionary rule and unconstitutional action, without any separation of
rights and remedies.39
33. See generally George M. Dery, III, “This Bitter Pill”: The Supreme Court’s Distaste
for the Exclusionary Rule in Davis v. United States Makes Evidence Suppression Impossible to
Swallow, 23 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 11–13, 19–27 (2012) (discussing the Davis Court’s
extensive “attack” on the exclusionary rule as a judicially created exception, blurring the line
between Fourth Amendment violations by police officers and the corresponding remedy for
those charged); Derik T. Fettig, When “Good Faith” Makes Good Sense: Applying Leon’s
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule to the Government’s Reasonable Reliance on Title III
Wiretap Orders, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 373, 375–84 (2012) (discussing the lack of clarity in the
Court’s application of the exclusionary rule’s good faith exception in wiretap orders); Eugene R.
Milhizer, Debunking Five Great Myths About the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 211
MIL. L. REV. 211, 214–17 (2012) (discussing the imprecision of the exclusionary rule as it
developed over time).
34. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
35. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
36. See Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule,
45 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2009).
37. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995) (“The exclusionary rule operates as a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment
rights through the rule’s general deterrent effect.”).
38. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 50–51 (1951); McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920);
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
39. See 547 U.S. 586, 613 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court has decided more
than 300 Fourth Amendment cases since Weeks. The Court has found constitutional violations in
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Conservative scholars and dissenting members of the judiciary did
not allow this elevation of a particular remedy for a constitutional
wrong to go unnoticed.40 Prominent voices such as Justice Benjamin
Cardozo and Judge Fred Friendly criticized the exclusionary rule. They
argued that the costs of exclusion far outweighed the benefits of
constitutional enforcement.41 Government litigants worked to restrict
the automatic application of the exclusionary remedy almost since its
creation.42 Judges, critical of its use, have repeatedly echoed the concern
that it makes little sense that “[t]he criminal [should] go free because
the constable has blundered.”43
Most notably, a series of exceptions to the application of the
exclusionary rule developed. These exceptions include now familiar
doctrines such as the “inevitable discovery exception,”44 the “good faith
exception,”45 and the attenuation exception.46 In addition, the Supreme
nearly a third of them. . . . But in every case involving evidence seized during an illegal search
of a home (federally since Weeks, nationally since Mapp), the Court . . . has either explicitly or
implicitly upheld (or required) the suppression of the evidence at trial. In not one of those cases
did the Court ‘questio[n], in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued
application of the [exclusionary] rule to suppress evidence from the State’s case’ in a criminal
trial.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171
(1978))); supra note 38.
40. See People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 586–88 (N.Y. 1926); see also Henry J. Friendly,
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 930, 949 (1965)
(noting that the Court’s exclusion remedy is “only a remedy in aid of a right; no one would
suggest that the police may engage in unbridled searches if they will dispense with use of the
provable fruits”).
41. In Defore, Justice Cardozo insisted that the court should “not subject society to the[]
dangers” of letting “[t]he criminal . . . go free because the constable has blundered.” 150 N.E. at
587–88; see also Friendly, supra note 40, at 953 (“[A] slight and unintentional miscalculation
by the police” should not result in a “dangerous criminal [going] free.”).
42. See Laurin, supra note 17, at 694 (“In 1981, Attorney General William French
Smith’s Task Force on Violent Crime urged that the exclusionary rule be reformed to remove
from its ambit ‘evidence . . . obtained by an officer acting in the reasonable, good faith belief
that it was in conformity to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution,’ and that this position be
advanced by Department of Justice lawyers in future criminal litigation.” (alteration in original)
(quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERALS TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL
REPORT 55 (1981))); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra, (“We recommend that the Attorney General
instruct United States Attorneys and the Solicitor General to urge this [good faith exception to
the exclusionary] rule in appropriate court proceedings, or support federal legislation
establishing this rule, or both.”); cf. Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly
Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice Blackmun’s Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing
Judicial Understanding About Its Effects in the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 48–49 (1994)
(describing a series of cases decided by the Supreme Court after Mapp that precluded the
application of the exclusionary rule where exclusion would not deter Fourth Amendment
violations).
43. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (quoting Defore, 150 N.E. at 587).
44. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (finding an exception to the
exclusionary rule if the information would have been ultimately discovered by lawful means).
45. See United States. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (reasoning that a court should
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Court exempted from exclusionary remedies certain categories of
noncriminal cases involving civil tax proceedings,47 habeas corpus
proceedings,48 and probation or parole violation hearings.49 While one
could argue that these cases laid the groundwork for a broader limitation
of the doctrine, most observers instead consider these decisions to be
prudential responses, counteracting a perceived windfall for the criminal
defendant.50 It is within this doctrinal framework that the Supreme
Court under Chief Justice Roberts began its challenge to the continued
use of the exclusionary rule.
B. Hudson-Herring-Davis
This section discusses the Hudson-Herring-Davis trilogy, a series of
cases that taken together sets out a new framework for the exclusionary
rule doctrine.51
1. Hudson v. Michigan
Hudson v. Michigan presented the simple issue of whether a
conceded knock-and-announce violation should result in the exclusion
not suppress evidence when an officer reasonably relies on a warrant issued by a magistrate).
46. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (finding an exception to the
exclusionary rule if the evidence obtained is so attenuated from the constitutional violation that
the taint of that violation has dissipated); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604–05
(1975) (declining to overrule Wong Sun).
47. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447, 454 (1976) (declining to extend the
exclusionary rule to civil tax proceedings because the deterrent effect would be small).
48. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481–82 (1976) (“[T]he Constitution does not
require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”).
49. See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) (holding that the
“exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction at parole revocation hearings of evidence seized
in violation of parolees’ Fourth Amendment rights”).
50. See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, Davis v. United States: The Exclusion Revolution
Continues, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 381, 395 (2011) (“According to the Court, the exclusionary
rule is designed to grant defendants an evidentiary ‘windfall’ for the limited purpose of deterring
‘culpable’ law enforcement violations of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”).
51. See George M. Dery, III, Good Enough for Government Work: The Court’s
Dangerous Decision in Herring v. United States, to Limit the Exclusionary Rule to Only the
Most Culpable Police Behavior, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 27 (2009) (“Not only did
Herring change the focus of analysis from identity of the wrongdoer to the level of government
culpability, but it also lowered the standards that apply to the wrongdoing. With the spotlight on
law enforcement rather than the judiciary, the Court no longer found careless mistakes to be a
problem. In fact, the Court explicitly rejected the contention that ‘negligence automatically
triggers suppression,’ ruling instead that when ‘police mistakes are the result of negligence such
as described here,’ any ‘marginal deterrence’ from exclusion simply ‘does not ‘pay its way.’’”
(footnote omitted) (quoting Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009) and United
States. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–08 n.6 (1984))).
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of evidence recovered.52 The facts were equally straightforward. Police
obtained a valid warrant to search Booker Hudson’s house.53 Instead of
waiting the appropriate amount of time after knocking and announcing,
police entered the house and recovered narcotics and a firearm.54
Hudson claimed that the evidence should be suppressed based on a clear
violation of the Fourth Amendment.55 The Supreme Court, with Justice
Scalia writing for the majority, disagreed.56 In a 5–4 decision, the Court
held that as a categorical matter, exclusion is never the appropriate
remedy for a knock-and-announce violation.57
The facts and legal issue in Hudson were simple, but the Court’s
reasoning was more complex. Justice Scalia dramatically reversed
course on decades of exclusionary rule precedent and presented a new
argument against exclusion. First, Justice Scalia reasoned that there was
no “but-for” causal connection between the constitutional violation and
the acquisition of evidence in this case.58 Here, the constitutional
violation of failing to knock and announce was not the reason the
evidence was recovered.59 The evidence was obtained pursuant to a
valid search warrant.60 In other words, courts could sever the method of
the search (which might have been a constitutional violation), from the
justification for the search (which was constitutionally valid).
As a secondary argument, Justice Scalia reasoned that even if one
believed there was but-for causality in the case, the harm was attenuated
from the constitutional violation.61 The Court thus crafted a new
concept of attenuation—one that considers as its determining factor
which interests are protected by the constitutional provision.
“Attenuation also occurs when, even given a direct causal connection,
the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been
violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence
obtained.”62
In the knock-and-announce context, this meant looking at what
interests the knock-and-announce doctrine protected. The Court
identified three interests: “the protection of human life and limb,” “the
protection of property,” and personal “privacy and dignity.”63 But the
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 588 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 587, 594.
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 592–93.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 594.
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Court argued that those interests were independent of, and thus not
relevant to, the interests governing the seizure of evidence pursuant to a
warrant.64 The Court has not further refined this novel attenuation
argument based on “constitutional interests.”65
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that even if there was but-for causality
and even if the harm was not attenuated, courts must still conduct a
cost–benefit analysis before they exclude evidence.66 Weighing the cost
to the community of letting a criminal go free, the cost to the court
system in terms of additional knock-and-announce cases, and the cost to
police officers of adding to an already dangerous search situation, the
Supreme Court had little difficulty finding the benefits of knocking and
announcing to not outweigh the cost of exclusion.67 Concluding that
there was almost no deterrence value in requiring exclusion for knockand-announce violations, Justice Scalia suggested relying on tort suits
and police professionalism to replace the accountability function of the
exclusionary rule.68
The tenor and scope of the Hudson opinion was so wide ranging that
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence to explain that
the majority had not just killed the exclusionary rule.69
The Court’s decision should not be interpreted as
suggesting that violations of the requirement are trivial or
beyond the law’s concern. Second, the continued operation
of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our
precedents, is not in doubt. Today’s decision determines
only that in the specific context of the knock-and-announce
requirement, a violation is not sufficiently related to the
later discovery of evidence to justify suppression.70
64. Id. (“What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected, however, is one’s
interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant.
Since the interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the
evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.”).
65. The Hudson Court’s new conception of attenuation was not central to the reasoning of
Herring or Davis. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428–29 (2011) (holding that
“[e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent
[that was later reversed] is not subject to the exclusionary rule” because applying the rule in that
context would have no deterrent value); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146–47 (2009)
(holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply where the defendant’s arrest resulted from an
officer’s reasonable reliance on a police database error because the error was isolated, not
systematic, so the marginal deterrent effect from applying rule would be outweighed by social
costs).
66. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594–99.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 596–99.
69. Id. at 602–03 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70. Id.
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As we will see, the specific context of knock-and-announce decisions
did not end the dismantling of the exclusionary rule, but Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence has had a significant impact in moderating the
Court’s approach.71
2. Herring v. United States
In Herring v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether a
police clerical mistake that resulted in the unconstitutional arrest of the
defendant warranted exclusion of the evidence found incident to that
arrest.72 The facts of Herring present an interesting backstory to
evaluate a discussion of police culpability.
Bennie Herring, the defendant in the case, had complained to local
prosecuting authorities that a particular police officer—Investigator
Mark Anderson—should be investigated for the murder of a local
teenager.73 Investigator Anderson, justifiably concerned about such an
accusation, went to Herring’s home to discuss the matter with him.74 On
the day in question, Investigator Anderson saw Herring near the local
police station and sought reason to detain him.75 Investigator Anderson
first called the local sheriff’s office to inquire if there were any
outstanding arrest warrants for Herring.76 Finding none, Investigator
Anderson asked the sheriff’s office clerk to check surrounding
jurisdictions.77 The neighboring computer system identified that a
warrant was active for Herring, and Investigator Anderson immediately
arrested him.78 During a search incident to Herring’s arrest, Anderson
recovered narcotics and a gun.79 Fifteen minutes later, the clerk
71. See David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The
Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2005–2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 283, 308–09
(suggesting that Hudson could portend the impending death of the exclusionary rule, but that
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Hudson has left the rest of the divided Court uncertain of how
he will vote if the Court grants certiorari on another case involving the exclusionary rule); David
A. Moran, Waiting for the Other Shoe: Hudson and the Precarious State of Mapp, 93 IOWA L.
REV. 1725, 1734–36 (2008) (describing how the uncertainty created by Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion in Hudson caused the Supreme Court “to lose its appetite” for Fourth
Amendment cases and start to deny certiorari petitions challenging Mapp v. Ohio); James J.
Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and the Future of Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 93 IOWA L.
REV. 1819, 1832–33, 1848–49, 1880–81 (2008) (recommending that lower courts apply Hudson
cautiously because Justice Kennedy’s concurrence broke the tie and urged a narrow holding).
72. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009).
73. Id. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
74. Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.2, Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009) (No. 07513).
75. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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discovered that, in fact, the warrant had been withdrawn and there was
no active warrant for Herring’s arrest.80 However, by the time the error
was relayed to Investigator Anderson, he had already arrested Herring
and recovered the contraband.81
As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals established, the arresting
officers “were entirely innocent of any wrongdoing or carelessness.”82
Further, the court assumed that the police error of record-keeping was
“a negligent failure to act, not a deliberate or tactical choice to act.”83
The court refused to exclude the evidence because the error was only an
isolated incidence of negligence and excluding the evidence would have
little deterrent value.84 On that record, the Supreme Court, with Chief
Justice Roberts writing for another 5–4 majority, reviewed the
applicability of the exclusionary rule to police errors.85
Chief Justice Roberts began the opinion by reframing the Court’s
understanding of the exclusionary rule. He emphasized four points.
First, he noted that the exclusionary rule is a “judicially created rule,”
not a constitutional mandate.86 Second, he stated that exclusion should
be considered the last resort for a remedy.87 Third, he stated that
exclusion is not itself an individual right.88 And, fourth, he concluded
that a finding of exclusion is only appropriate when it would deter
future Fourth Amendment violations.89 This last point then requires a
court to balance the costs and benefits of exclusion.90
Under this interpretation, the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule
turns on the “flagrancy” of police misconduct.91 The more intentional
the constitutional violation, the more likely exclusion will deter future
acts.92 The less culpable the police misconduct, however, the less
effective exclusion will be in deterring future violations.93
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 695
(2009).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699–704.
86. Id. at 699.
87. Id. at 700.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 701.
92. See id. (“The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence
principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct.” (emphasis added)).
93. See id. at 702 (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence
is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule
serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances
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This new standard based on police culpability led the Court to
determine that the evidence recovered from Herring need not be
suppressed.94 The clerical error was negligent, apparently isolated, and
quickly corrected.95 While the dissenting Justices offered different
frames of analysis and different cost–benefit calculations, the
controlling majority (including Justice Kennedy) held that a negligent,
attenuated error did not require exclusion of evidence.96
3. Davis v. United States
The most recent Supreme Court case on the exclusionary rule is
Davis v. United States.97 Davis involved the question of whether
evidence obtained by officers following binding appellate precedent
should be excluded, if that precedent was later declared
unconstitutional.98 In Davis, the officer had searched a car and
recovered contraband in accordance with New York v. Belton, a
controlling case that was later overturned by Arizona v. Gant.99 The
Supreme Court reasoned that the police officer’s actions, although later
declared unconstitutional, were at the time perfectly legal and quite
reasonable.100 Thus, there was no deterrent value in suppressing
evidence recovered from a then-lawful search.101
Davis is notable because it wholeheartedly adopted the logic and
spirit of Herring.102 Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority
stated: “The [exclusionary] rule’s sole purpose, we have repeatedly
held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”103 Justice Alito
then cited United States v. Leon and Herring to emphasize the new
focus on police culpability:
When the police exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly
negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the
recurring or systemic negligence.”).
94. Id. at 704.
95. Id. at 706 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 704 (majority opinion).
97. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
98. Id. at 2423.
99. Id. at 2425–26; see Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009) (holding that
“Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the
arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle”); New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of
the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile”).
100. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2434.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., id. at 2427–29 (setting forth, and eventually applying, Herring’s police
culpability analysis).
103. Id. at 2426.
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deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh
the resulting costs. But when police act with an objectively
‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful,
or when their conduct involves only simple, ‘isolated’
negligence, the ‘deterrence rationale loses much of its
force’ . . . .104
Because Davis involved a police officer’s reasonable reliance on
binding appellate case law, there was no issue of culpability and no
reason for exclusion.105 As the Court reasoned, the “acknowledged
absence of police culpability doom[ed] Davis’[s] claim.”106 The
question is what this doctrinal shift means in practice to the litigants and
judges who must apply the Supreme Court’s terminology in suppression
hearings.
C. A New Exclusionary Standard: Culpability-Centered
The exclusionary rule under the Roberts Court now turns on an
analysis of the culpability of the law enforcement agent or agency as a
way of evaluating the deterrent value of exclusion. It is purportedly an
objective test, as the Court has created the term “objectively culpable”
to denote an analysis of objective wrongdoing that is based on an
officer’s particular knowledge and experience, but not the officer’s
purely subjective intent.107
The focus on levels of culpability as the determining factor for
exclusion rests on the Court’s belief that misconduct is deterrable only
when the misconduct is committed in a deliberate, reckless, grossly
negligent, or recurring manner.108 Thus, these are the only types of
conduct that require the extreme remedy of exclusion.109 In other words,
the exclusionary rule will not deter misconduct that is merely negligent
or committed in good faith because the wrongdoer does not realize he
has committed a wrong.
While questions about the scope and meaning of culpability remain
to be explored, the Court reaffirmed that the exclusionary remedy is
104. Id. at 2427–28 (citations omitted) (quoting Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695,
698, 702 (2009) and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909, 919 (1984)).
105. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423–24.
106. Id. at 2428.
107. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702–03. But see Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and
Three-Dollar Steaks: The Subjective/Objective Dimensions of Probable Cause and Reasonable
Suspicion, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 751, 776 (2010) (“[T]he very notion of culpability seems to be
a subjective one, and in fact the Court drew a distinction in Herring between a ‘negligen[t] or
innocent mistake’ and one that is ‘deliberate’ or ‘knowing[],’ a distinction phrased explicitly in
subjective terms.” (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
108. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
109. Id.
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inappropriate in several recurring circumstances in which a police
officer relies in good faith on information from other sources. Thus, it is
clear that a good-faith error in a warrant duly signed by a magistrate
judge will not require exclusion.110 Similarly, a judicial clerk error or
police administrative error does not require exclusion.111 Finally, good
faith reliance on legislative decisions or current law does not require
exclusion.112
While these issues are settled by precedent, courts will likely have to
determine whether the exclusionary rule applies when an individual
officer makes a mistake based simply on his or her own misjudgment.
In that situation, courts will likely find there was a constitutional
violation. Under the traditional rules, this constitutional violation would
trigger suppression. Under the new exclusionary rules, this violation
will only trigger a second-step inquiry into the objective culpability of
the police officer or police department. It is this new reality that litigants
must consider as they face a culpability-centered exclusionary rule.
II. QUESTIONS ABOUT A CULPABILITY-CENTERED
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Several questions about language immediately arise from the
Supreme Court’s new culpability-centered standard. First, what did the
Court mean by the term objectively culpable and what factors can be
considered by courts or established by litigants trying to argue this
standard?113 Second, how should courts define “deliberate,” “reckless,”
“grossly negligent,” and “recurring negligence”? These terms have a
recognized meaning in civil law contexts such as constitutional tort
cases, but it is unclear whether the Supreme Court meant to import these
definitions to the exclusionary rule context.114 Criminal law scholars
have also used these terms to distinguish levels of criminal culpability,
but it is also unclear whether the Supreme Court meant to adopt those
110. Leon, 468 U.S. at 917, 926 (holding the exclusionary rule should not apply when
officers reasonably rely on a subsequently invalidated search warrant issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate).
111. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1995) (holding that “[a]pplication of the Leon
framework supports a categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court
employees” (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 916–22)); Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703 (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply when the officers rely on an error in a police-operated warrant
record system).
112. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355–57 (1987) (holding that the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable when an officer reasonably relies on a statute subsequently deemed
unconstitutional); see also Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) (noting that the
Court in Krull “extended the good-faith exception to searches conducted in reasonable reliance
on subsequently invalidated statutes”).
113. See infra Section II.A.
114. See infra Section II.B.
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criminal law definitions.115 In a few instances, the Roberts Court
substituted “flagrant” for the term “deliberate” when it made analogies
to the history of flagrant constitutional abuses in Weeks, Mapp, and
Silverthorne.116 But the Court has offered no clarifying analogies
concerning a recklessness standard or gross negligence standard.117
Finally, in Hudson, the Court redefined the concept of attenuation to
involve a consideration of the interests behind the constitutional right at
issue—a previously unnecessary consideration.118
The Court also remained silent about what information trial courts
should examine to make these culpability-based determinations. In the
civil context, recklessness and negligence presuppose an established
standard of care that a particular action can be measured against.119 In
the criminal context, gross negligence is regularly equated with criminal
negligence.120 Further, recurrent negligence requires an understanding
of systemic benchmarks against which to compare the particular
conduct. While it is clear that the Hudson-Herring-Davis trilogy
involves a new paradigm, it is not clear how to implement the Supreme
Court’s new standard.121 The Court provides no framework from which
to judge these familiar terms or standards, which leaves it to trial courts
and litigants to choose the appropriate standard. This section questions
the Supreme Court’s choice of language in creating a culpability-based
exclusionary rule analysis.
A. Definitional Questions: Objectively Culpable
In Herring, the majority coined the term objectively culpable, which,
while taking into account the officer’s particular knowledge and
experience, is to be evaluated against the “reasonable officer
115. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 705 (1983).
116. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)).
117. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702–03. The Court suggested that police conduct that is
“deliberate, reckless, or grossly neglient” is “sufficiently culpable” to trigger the exclusionary
rule, yet the Court did not define those terms separately. Id.
118. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006).
119. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 68 (2007) (“While ‘the term
recklessness is not self-defining,’ the common law has generally understood it in the sphere of
civil liability as conduct violating an objective standard: action entailing ‘an unjustifiably high
risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.’” (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994))); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289, cmt. i (1965)
(“The standard to which the actor must conform is that of the reasonably careful person under
like circumstances . . . .”).
120. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1134 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “criminal negligence” as
“[g]ross negligence so extreme that it is punishable as a crime”).
121. See Moran, supra note 7, at 378 (“Since the discussion of officer culpability in
Herring and Davis was dicta, we do not really know what ‘gross negligence’ means.”).
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standard”—namely “whether a reasonably well trained officer would
have known that the search was illegal.”122 The Court expressly rejected
a “subjective intent” standard,123 but as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
pointed out in dissent: “It is not clear how the Court squares its focus on
deliberate conduct with its recognition that application of the
exclusionary rule does not require inquiry into the mental state of the
police.”124 In addition, it is not clear how one is to measure the
particular officer’s actions against the reasonable officer standard
without such an individualized inquiry into the officer’s mental state.125
Before Herring, the Supreme Court had never used the term
objectively culpable to determine the extent of exclusion, and, in fact,
had never used the term in any prior case for any reason.126 The
meaning of “objectively culpable” is inherently puzzling. Culpability is
a familiar term in criminal law.127 Most criminal laws are predicated on
levels of wrongdoing, such that crimes and their punishment vary
according to the individual blameworthiness of the offender.128
122. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 703 (2009) (quoting United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. See Alschuler, supra note 9, at 485 (“Despite the Court’s declaration that its standard
was objective, its opinion repeatedly used the term ‘good faith.’ The Court, however,
accompanied its use of this apparently subjective term with an odd and oxymoronic modifier; it
spoke of ‘objective good faith.’ Proof that a particular officer had acted in bad faith appeared to
be irrelevant. The test was simply whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known
that his search was unlawful.”); Laurin, supra note 17, at 727 (“On its face, the Court’s
insistence that the standard it articulates be applied objectively seems nonsensical: Even if the
lowest grade of culpability to trigger exclusion, gross negligence, could be assessed solely by
reference to objective factors, proof of reckless or deliberate conduct typically requires a
subjective inquiry.” (footnote omitted)).
124. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 710 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
125. See Alschuler, supra note 9, at 483 (“Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Herring sent
objective and subjective pronouncements flying in all directions. Although the Supreme Court
proclaimed unambiguously that its standard was objective, it also unambiguously invited courts
to examine the mental states of police officers.”); Dery, supra note 33, at 26 (“The entire point
of assessing a deliberate falsehood is to look inside an individual’s mind to see not only what he
or she knew but also what he or she meant to make others believe. Such an inquiry outstrips the
straightforward assessment of what a reasonable person would do in a particular situation. It
leads to questions of intent and motivation of a particular person—an inquiry explicitly rejected
by the Court in Whren.”).
126. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703. Chief Justice Roberts’s use of the phrase is the only
time these words have appeared in a Supreme Court case, prior or even since. The Court in
Davis chose not to use the standard, so there is still no indication as to what the phrase means
beyond how Chief Justice Roberts used it.
127. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 213–90 (8th ed. 2007); CHARLES E.
TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW 164–65 (15th ed. 1993) (“Reducing it to its simplest terms,
a crime consists in the concurrence of prohibited conduct and culpable mental state.”).
128. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (“American criminal law has long
considered a defendant’s intention—and therefore his moral guilt—to be critical to ‘the degree
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Intuitively, it makes sense to consider the individual’s blameworthiness
in determining whether a criminal sanction should be imposed. An act
of homicide can be manslaughter or first-degree murder based on the
subjective intent of the offender.129 Similarly, the act of taking property
of another may be considered a theft (or no crime at all) depending upon
the subjective intent of the actor.130 The objective act in each remains
unchanged, but the societal condemnation changes based on the mental
state of the actor.
Civil standards, of course, purport to make this reasonable personlike comparison, but “civil liability,” not “culpability,” is the preferred
term.131 The Supreme Court has never used the term “civil culpability”
because it begins to blur the already well-established lines for criminal
blameworthiness and civil fault.132 While the Court may have intended
to import the idea of civil tort liability from qualified immunity cases,
the Court did not do so explicitly.133
No doubt because of this linguistic confusion, Justice Alito, in
adopting the spirit of Herring, altered the definition in Davis. Justice
Alito reframed the test by stating that when “police act with an
objectively ‘reasonable good faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful, or
when their conduct involves only simple, ‘isolated’ negligence, the
‘deterrence rationale loses much of its force,’ and exclusion cannot ‘pay
its way.’”134 But, how would we know if an officer acted with the
of [his] criminal culpability’ . . . .” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
129. For example, the difference in homicide degrees is based on the subjective intent of
the actor. Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1–a (West, Westlaw through ch. 270 of 2013
Reg. Sess.), with id. § 630:2. First degree murder requires that the person purposefully cause the
death of another whereas manslaughter can be accomplished by recklessness. The difference in
punishment is different, in that for first degree murder a person will receive a life sentence with
no chance of parole. See, e.g., id. § 630:1–a.
130. If one takes a wallet from a table with the specific intent to permanently deprive the
owner of their property, it is a crime. If one takes a wallet with the intent of returning it to the
lawful owner, it is not a crime. The objective fact of taking the wallet is unchanged. What
matters is the subjective reason for taking it.
131. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371–72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(distinguishing between criminal culpability and civil liability).
132. The term “civil culpability” has never been used in any Supreme Court case. Cf.
Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 419 (2002) (discussing the
distinction between civil liability and criminal culpability or blameworthiness).
133. See Laurin, supra note 17, at 672; see also Colin Starger, Response: Metaphor and
Meaning in Trawling for Herring, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 109, 109–110 (2011); Robert L.
Tsai & Nelson Tebbe, Notes on Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
140, 142–43 (2011).
134. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2011) (citations omitted) (quoting
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 n.6, 909, 919 (1984) and Herring v. United States, 129
S. Ct. 695, 697 (2009)). The source for this new test is Herring and Leon, both cases that have
nothing to do with the particular officer’s individual culpability. This test also runs against prior
precedent that did not excuse good-faith errors from constitutional condemnation. Terry v. Ohio,
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reasonable good faith belief that his or her conduct was
constitutional?135 The question appears to require considering the
officer’s knowledge of the law, his intent in applying the law, and the
officer’s conduct compared to other reasonable officers who might
apply the same law.136 While perhaps appropriate in a civil rights case
against a police officer, this additional inquiry could now become part
of everyday suppression hearings.137 Justice Alito’s explanation that
“[r]esponsible law-enforcement officers will take care to learn ‘what is
required of them’ under Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform
their conduct to these rules”138 only reinforces the idea that inquiry into
individual and institutional training and rules may soon be required.139

392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (“And simple ‘good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not
enough.’ . . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth
Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97
(1964))).
135. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 807 A.2d 500, 516 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (“[A]ny ‘objective’
test implies the existence of a standard of conduct, and, where the standard is not defined by the
generic—a reasonable person—but rather by the specific—a reasonable officer—it is more
likely that [Federal Rule of Evidence] 702’s line between common and specialized knowledge
has been crossed.” (alteration in original)). For example, in an excessive force case, “the
question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
136. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703. This is not a mere adoption of the Leon “good faith”
test because there is no separate entity (a judicial officer) on which to rely. Instead, Justice Alito
seemed to combine the Herring “objective culpability” language with Leon to apply to police
officers. This is a wholly new construction of good faith and one that leaves many questions
unanswered.
137. As Part III discusses, this new step raises a series of questions about how to define
culpability.
138. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006)).
139. Part of the difficulty in applying the standard can be attributed to the Supreme Court’s
manipulation of the idea of deterrence. Specifically, the Supreme Court made an
unacknowledged shift from an exclusionary rule focused on general deterrence to an
exclusionary rule also focused on specific deterrence. See Eugene Milhizer, The Exclusionary
Rule Lottery Revisited, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 751 (2010). In both Herring and Davis, the
Court looked to the actions of the particular law enforcement agents and asked whether
exclusion would have an effect on their individual actions in the future. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at
2427 (“The basic insight of the Leon line of cases is that the deterrence benefits of exclusion
‘var[y] with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct’ at issue.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701)). This had not been the approach in earlier cases in which
the courts eschewed a case-by-case approach to look at broad general deterrence principles. See
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (reasoning that the “purpose [of the
exclusionary rule] is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it”).
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B. Definitional Questions: Mens Rea Terminology
A related series of questions emerge if we take the new terms of
culpability seriously. In both Herring and Davis, the Supreme Court
relied on the language of deliberate, reckless, grossly negligent, and
recurring or systemic negligence without providing definitions.140 As
Professor Jennifer Laurin and others demonstrate, these terms find their
roots in civil tort liability and qualified immunity cases involving
unconstitutional actions of police officers.141 The “constitutional
borrowing” of that legal terminology and application to the exclusionary
rule has profound implications.142 As Professor Laurin argues, the
Supreme Court has adopted a language and framework modeled on
constitutional tort principles without acknowledging that it is doing
so.143
While these terms have a logical connection to civil tort liability,
they also have meaning in criminal law. As an initial matter, courts will
be faced with whether to judge these terms of culpability under a civil
or criminal standard. Courts will likely follow the civil model, but an
exploration of the different standards offers new insights about how
courts may parse a complicated and inconsistently defined set of terms.
1. Deliberate
Deliberate is a familiar term in civil law. Frequently used to describe
intentional acts,144 or to modify a conscious failure to meet a duty (as in
“deliberate indifference”),145 it is a common modifier for willful acts.146
140. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2472–28 (quoting Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702). In Davis, Justice
Alito used the term “isolated negligence” as a definition of an action that did not require an
exclusion sanction. Id. at 2438.
141. See Laurin, supra note 17, at 727; Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a
Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV. 687, 749–50 (2011) (“Herring’s version of the good faith
exception threatens to import the ‘clearly established law’ requirement from habeas and
qualified immunity cases into criminal cases.”).
142. See Laurin, supra note 17, at 739–42. See generally Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai,
Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 461 (2010) (providing a thorough discussion
of constitutional borrowing).
143. Laurin, supra note 17, at 727 (“Herring’s elevation of culpability as the ‘critical’
feature of the Court’s exclusionary rule inquiry squarely aligns the suppression remedy with the
fault-based framework of constitutional torts—in contrast to the norm in criminal procedure
remedies.”).
144. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 492 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “deliberate” as “[i]ntentional;
premeditated; fully considered”).
145. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (addressing municipal liability
under a failure-to-train theory and concluding that inadequate police training may only serve as
the basis for § 1983 liability if the failure to train rises to the level of deliberate indifference to
the rights of individuals).
146. As one example, in Ohio, deliberate is used as a nonmodifying prefix to intent,
resulting in the seemingly redundant term of deliberate intent. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
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Intentional torts reference deliberate actions.147 Intentional violations of
constitutional rights rest on deliberate conduct.148 Other times, the term
deliberate serves to establish fault for other types of constitutional
wrongdoing.149 While varying in the contexts in which it arises,
deliberateness generally establishes a willful, intentional act.150
§ 2745.01 (West, Westlaw through 2013 File 59 of 130th Gen. Assemb.). When the Supreme
Court of Ohio applied this paradigm to employment tort law, it held that a statutorily required
finding of deliberate intent was met if a plaintiff could show the defendant acted with, “‘specific
intent’ to cause an injury to another.” Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc., 983
N.E.2d 1253, 1258 (Ohio 2012). In contrast, the New Jersey Superior Court has used deliberate
as a meaningful adjective to describe the gravamen (in this case, the falsification of medical
records) of a medical malpractice tort. The court held that “a deliberate falsification by a
physician of his patient’s medical record, particularly when the reason therefor [sic] is to protect
his own interests . . . must be regarded as gross malpractice.” In re Suspension or Revocation of
the License of Jascalevich, 442 A.2d 635, 645 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (emphasis
added). In contrast with the previous example, the New Jersey court’s use of deliberate appears
to distinguish tortious deliberate falsification from (possibly) benign inadvertent falsification.
147. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical
Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77, 93 n.94 (2003) (“Intentional torts are injuries
committed with the purpose to bring about a desired result or a substantial certainty that a
desired consequence will occur: ‘One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to
liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not [privileged].’
Battery, assault, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion,
trespass to land, and trespass to chattels are examples of intentional torts.” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979)).
148. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) (noting that culpability
evincing an intent to injure would “most probably support a substantive due process claim”);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that the Eighth Amendment is violated by
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners”); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d
1152, 1154, 1162, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992) (reversing summary judgment because a reasonable jury
could find that a police officer may be liable under § 1983 after he deliberately ignored
exonerating information that indicated he had arrested the wrong person); Whitley v. Seibel, 613
F.2d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 1980) (concluding that while negligent acts in an investigation do not
violate due process, intentional acts may).
149. See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57–58 (1988) (holding that to make a
successful due process violation claim against the state, a defendant must show that the state
acted in bad faith by failing to preserve evidence); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274–
75 (1980) (“This is not a case where, in Justice Cardozo’s words, ‘the
constable . . . blundered,’ . . . rather, it is one where the ‘constable’ planned an impermissible
interference with the right to the assistance of counsel.” (citations omitted)); Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414 n.2 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Here, we have a Sixth
Amendment case and also one in which the police deliberately took advantage of an inherently
coercive setting in the absence of counsel, contrary to their express agreement.”); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (“We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic
protections of [the Sixth Amendment] guarantee when there was used against him at his trial
evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from
him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.”).
150. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 302 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of
54th Legis. 2013) (stating that an intentional tort “exist[s] only when the employee is injured as
a result of willful, deliberate, specific intent of the employer to cause such injury”); Nabozny v.
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Deliberate action in a criminal law framework can best be equated
with intentional, including purposeful and knowing, actions.151 In some
criminal contexts, deliberate is more considered than intentional, as
deliberate involves a weighing of choices and a decision.152 State
criminal statutes emphasize the willful, intentional nature of the
wrongdoing.153 The Model Penal Code term “purposely” similarly
speaks to conscious intention154 or knowing action.155 While the
language of state statutes differs, the general view is that a conviction
based on deliberate actions requires proof of a subjective intent to
commit the wrongful act.
In terms of applying the deliberate standard to the exclusionary rule,
a deliberate violation of a constitutional right would require purposeful,
considered action to violate the Constitution.156 For example, a law
Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (“[A] player is liable for injury in a tort
action if his conduct is such that it is either deliberate, willful or with a reckless disregard for the
safety of the other player so as to cause injury to that player . . . .”).
151. See, e.g., Deibler v. State, 776 A.2d 657, 662 (Md. 2001) (noting that “[t]he term
willfully in criminal statutes has been said . . . to characterize an act done with deliberate
intention for which there is no reasonable excuse” (alteration in original) (quoting Ewell v.
State, 114 A.2d 66, 72 (Md. 1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
152. See, e.g., ROY MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 208 (1952) (“[A] ‘deliberate’
killing is a more opprobrious offense than an ‘intentional’ one since it is a weighed act.”); 12
WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 392 (Jeffrey Lehman & Shirelle Phelps eds., 2d ed.
2005) (“When used to describe a crime, deliberate denotes that the perpetrator has weighed the
motives for the conduct against its consequences and the criminal character of the conduct
before deciding to act in such a manner. A deliberate person does not act rashly or suddenly but
with a preconceived intention. Deliberate is synonymous with premeditated.”).
153. Many statutes include the language premeditated and deliberate as a requirement for
first degree murder. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39–13–202(a)(1) (2013) (providing that “[a]
premeditated and intentional killing of another” constitutes first degree murder).
154. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (1962) (“A person acts purposely with respect to a
material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a
result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a
result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence
of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.” (emphasis added)).
155. Id. § 2.02(2)(b) (“A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that
his conduct will cause such a result.” (emphasis added)).
156. Examples of deliberate violations of constitutional rights exist in Supreme Court case
law. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011) (“[D]eliberate indifference is a
stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or
obvious consequence of his action . . . . to violate citizens’ constitutional rights . . . .” (alteration
in original) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997))) (internal
quotation marks omitted); id. (“Policymakers’ ‘continued adherence to an approach that they
know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the
conscious disregard for the consequences of their action—the ‘deliberate indifference’—
necessary to trigger municipal liability.’” (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 407)); Missouri v.
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enforcement officer would have to know the existing Fourth
Amendment standard and then intentionally or purposely violate it. In
the Terry stop context, the officer would need to know that he needed
reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect, to know that he did not have
reasonable suspicion, and to make the stop anyway.157
Under both a civil and criminal deliberate standard, the analysis
would largely be the same. Arguably, a police officer might
intentionally (civil standard) stop someone without reasonable suspicion
and without deliberating about it (criminal standard), but the willful
nature of the act likely will be sufficient to justify exclusion under either
standard.158 Both might fall into the category of flagrant conduct, which
Chief Justice Roberts considered to provide the clearest justification for
exclusion.159 Importantly, as Part III discusses, the officer’s intent
would be fair game for cross-examination and argument under both the
civil and criminal standards.

Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 620 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The police used a two-step
questioning technique based on a deliberate violation of Miranda.”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 842 (1994) (explaining that a prison official acts with “deliberate indifference”
sufficient to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim if “the official acted or failed to act despite his
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm”); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270
(1980) (“The question here is whether under the facts of this case a Government agent
‘deliberately elicited’ incriminating statements . . . within the meaning of Massiah.”); Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (“[T]he Court has not questioned, in the absence of a more
efficacious sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress evidence from the State’s
case where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate.”); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (holding that the government violated the Sixth
Amendment by using at trial incriminating statements that were deliberately elicited from the
petitioner in the absence of counsel).
157. Or, in the interrogation context, an officer would have to interrogate an individual
without Miranda warnings despite the officer’s knowing that Miranda warnings are required for
custodial interrogation, and create a statement actually used against the defendant at trial. Of
course, the constitutional violation would only occur if the government were trying to introduce
the statement at trial. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2004) (“[P]olice do not violate
a suspect’s constitutional rights (or the Miranda rule) by negligent or even deliberate failures to
provide the suspect with the full panoply of warnings prescribed by Miranda. Potential
violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at
trial.”).
158. One potential wrinkle to adopting the criminal law definition is whether the
accompanying defenses should come along with it. For example, in criminal law a reasonable
and even unreasonable mistake of fact or law would negate the mens rea normally associated
with specific intent crimes. As such, unless the officer admitted to the unconstitutional intent,
there would be no real way to exclude evidence based on a deliberate violation. Any mistake
would negative the intent, and thus, under an analogous criminal law framework, exonerate the
officer from wrongdoing.
159. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701–02 (2009) (describing the flagrant
nature of early exclusionary rule abuses).
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2. Reckless
Recklessness in the civil law context is understood as an action that
consciously ignores a potential harm.160 Courts define recklessness as
acting with a conscious and unjustified awareness of the risks.161 This
involves both objective considerations (e.g., the unreasonableness of the
risk) and subjective considerations (e.g., the individual actor’s
awareness or knowledge of the risks).162 As the Restatement of Torts
summarizes:
The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of
another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act
which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having
reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man
to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable
risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make
his conduct negligent.163

160. One must act with a conscious appreciation for the potential harm his or her action
may cause, or reasonably should have appreciated the potential harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 500 (1965); see, e.g., Hickingbotham v. Burke, 662 A.2d 297, 301 (N.H. 1995) (“A
social host’s service of alcohol would be reckless if the host ‘consciously disregard[ed] a
substantial and unjustifiable risk’ of a high degree of danger. The risk that the host disregards
must be ‘of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to [the actor], its disregard involves a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’”
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (6th ed.
1990))). Note that the mens rea requirement of recklessness should not be confused with an
intentional tort: a reckless actor does not intend to cause the resultant harm, he or she only
intends to engage in the high-risk action and is cognizant of its potential harmful outcome. See
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS
199 (11th ed. 2005).
161. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 68 (2007) (“While ‘the term recklessness
is not self-defining,’ the common law has generally understood it in the sphere of civil liability
as conduct violating an objective standard: action entailing ‘an unjustifiably high risk of harm
that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.’” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 836 (1994))). Indiana case law defines recklessly as acting with a “plain, conscious,
and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial
deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” Kimball v. State, 474 N.E.2d 982, 985 (Ind.
1985).
162. Harry F. Tepker, Jr., The Arbitrary Path of Due Process, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 219
n.145 (2000) (“Judicial definitions of ‘reckless conduct’ seem to follow similar, though not
identical, patterns of assessing both objective factors—such as the degree or unreasonableness
of risk—and subjective factors—such as awareness, knowledge, and intent.”).
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
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Again, while the recklessness standard varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction (and cause to cause), it generally includes awareness of and
a rejection of ordinary duties to avoid risk.164
Recklessness has also been well studied by criminal law scholars and
judges.165 State statutes define recklessness as acting with the awareness
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that involves a gross deviation
from what a reasonable person would do in the actor’s situation.166 The
Model Penal Code also tracks this language.167 A key point is awareness
of the type of risk (substantial and unjustified) and the choice to act in a
164. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(C) (LexisNexis 2013) (providing that
recklessness is defined as “heedless indifference to the consequences, [by] perversely
disregard[ing] a known risk that [one’s] conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to
be of a certain nature”); Dronsejko v. Thornton, 632 F.3d 658, 665 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining
that “[r]ecklessness is defined as conduct that is an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care’” (quoting City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045
(7th Cir. 1977) (“[A] highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and
which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or
is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.” (citation omitted)); see also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1271 (6th ed. 1990) (“recklessness” is defined as “[t]he state of mind
accompanying an act, which either pays no regard to its probably or possibly injurious
consequences, or which, though forseeing such consequences, persists in spite of such
knowledge”).
165. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 29, at 959 (“In my view, what should justify a judgment
of criminal recklessness is that the actor is aware that she is taking an unjustifiable risk or, at the
very least, is aware that there is a significant likelihood that her intended conduct is
unjustifiable. . . .”).
166. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 49 A.3d 1090, 1103 (Del. 2012) (“Awareness of, and
conscious disregard for, a substantial, unjustifiable risk will suffice to constitute recklessness.”);
State v. Sewell, 603 A.2d 21, 28 (N.J. 1992) (citing 2 THE NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMISSION, commentary to § 2C:2-2, at
41–42 (1971)) (noting that recklessness resembles knowledge in that both involve a state of
awareness: the awareness in knowledge being ‘certainty’ of a result; that of ‘recklessness’
involving the conscious disregard of a ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk’ that a result will
occur); State v. Ramsey, 1 A.3d 796, 800 n.5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (“Reckless
culpability is a lesser culpability to purposeful or knowing conduct.” (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:2–2(b)(1)–(3) (West 2013)); State v. Murphy, 447 A.2d 219, 221 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1982).
167. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962) (“A person acts recklessly with respect to a
material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”); see also Dannye
Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability Provisions on State Legislatures:
A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L.
REV. 229, 229–30 (1997) (discussing the Model Penal Code’s redefinition of culpable mental
states and influence on criminal law in more than half of all states).

650

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

way unlike a reasonable person (deviating from a reasonable standard of
conduct). Another key point is that awareness of a risk must be
considered in relation to the reasons for the risk. Thus, if there is a
justified reason for the risk, the act may not, in fact, be reckless.168
Civil recklessness and criminal recklessness involve different
standards. As the Supreme Court explained, “Unlike civil recklessness,
criminal recklessness . . . requires subjective knowledge on the part of
the offender.”169 Thus, civil recklessness involves “conduct violating an
objective standard: action entailing an unjustifiably high risk of harm
that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.”170 Criminal
recklessness builds on this objective “should have been aware” standard
and requires actual, subjective awareness.171 Thus, choosing a criminal
reckless definition would raise the bar on exclusion. It would also signal
a shift away from the objective standards the Court seems to favor in the
qualified immunity context.172
In terms of applying this civil recklessness standard to the wrongful
action of a police officer for purposes of exclusion, a court would have
to first determine the objective standard of what a reasonable police
officer would do.173 Then, a court would have to determine if the
168. According to Professor Joshua Dressler, the awareness of the risk is judged in
comparison to the reasons for taking the risk. See JOSHUA DRESSLER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 154 (3d ed. 2003) (“The risk of which the actor is aware must of
course be substantial in order for the recklessness judgment to be made. The risk must also be
unjustifiable. Even substantial risks, it is clear, may be created without recklessness when the
actor is seeking to serve a proper purpose . . . .”).
169. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 68 n.18 (2007).
170. Id. at 68 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
171. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–37 (clarifying that criminal law permits a finding of
recklessness only when the defendant possesses an actual, subjective awareness of the risk of
harm).
172. In general, constitutional tort liability and its companion doctrine, qualified immunity,
turn on objective considerations. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987); Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Supreme Court has been clear that any subjective
intent of the officer’s conduct is not relevant even if questions of the officer’s knowledge and
experience are relevant. See id. at 815–18 (concluding that the Court will not consider evidence
of subjective intent in cases where government officials rely on qualified immunity as an
affirmative defense and that the Court will only consider whether an official’s conduct
“violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known”).
173. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–20 (1984) (“[W]here the officer’s
conduct is objectively reasonable, excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the
exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that . . . the officer is acting
as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances.” (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539–40 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see, e.g., Kladis v. Brezek, 823 F.2d 1014,
1019 (7th Cir. 1987) (using the reasonable officer standard to determine if a police officer used
excessive force); Patrick v. Moorman, 855 F. Supp. 2d 392, 402 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (explaining
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officer’s actions unjustifiably risked harm that he or she should have
known could occur.174
For the criminal recklessness standard to apply, a police officer
would have to be aware of a suspect’s constitutional rights and to act in
a way that substantially and unjustifiably risked violating those rights.
In the Terry context, the officer, knowing that he needed reasonable
suspicion, would nevertheless act without reasonable suspicion and in a
way that substantially and unjustifiably risked violating the Fourth
Amendment. However, since this risk must be judged in comparison to
the reasons for taking the risk, the officer might be able to minimize the
unjustified nature of his or her actions by pointing to the importance of
stopping potential criminal activity.175 This balancing might offer courts
real flexibility in avoiding a finding of recklessness.
Under either a civil or criminal standard, the questions for
suppression hearings are new and expansive. In suppression hearings
courts have purposely avoided inquiries into objective standards of care,
awareness of those standards, and deviations from them.176 All of this
how a reasonable officer would determine if a suspect posed a threat to those around him);
White v. State, 19 A.3d 369, 372 (Md. 2011) (discussing the reasonable police officer standard
as explained by an expert witness). In excessive force cases, the reasonableness of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396 (1989).
174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). The “objective” comparison
might not open questions into the particular officer’s awareness of the constitutional rights or
justification for acting. In suppression hearings, however, establishing a reasonable officer
standard will burden the court because the court will have to establish the reasonable officer
benchmark and then compare the particular officer’s awareness and actions to that benchmark
standard.
175. See Hannah B. Schieber, Comment, Utter Confusion: Why “Utter Disregard for
Human Life” Should Be Replaced with an Objective Analysis of the Defendant’s Activity, 2011
WIS. L. REV. 691, 698 (“Scholars often conceptualize criminal recklessness as requiring two
states of mind: the ‘belief-state,’ referring to the defendant’s awareness of the risk, and the
‘desire-state,’ referring to the defendant’s reasons for taking the risk. The desire-state does not
indicate a desire to cause harm, but instead either an insufficient aversion to harm or a readiness
to create a risk of harm. Determinations of recklessness become what Professor Joshua Dressler
refers to as a ‘criminal law version of the Learned Hand formula.’ The fact finder considers the
level of risk of harm the defendant created in light of the likelihood of that harm occurring, then
weighs that against the defendant’s apparent reasons for engaging in the behavior. If a defendant
knew that his actions created a significant risk but had legitimate reasons for creating those risks
(such as speeding down a highway to rush someone to the hospital), a jury may not find his
actions to be criminally reckless.” (footnotes omitted)).
176. Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71,
80–81 (2007) (“In Whren v. United States, however, the Court unanimously rejected the
defendants’ proposed ‘reasonable police officer’ standard—i.e., that ‘the Fourth Amendment
test for traffic stops should be . . . whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made
the stop for the reason given’—and held instead that a traffic stop is reasonable for
constitutional purposes so long as it was based on probable cause. In so doing, the Court spoke
disparagingly about the whole notion of objective standards, referring to them as ‘exercise[s]’ in
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may change as courts wrestle with the difficult culpability terms that
they may now be required to apply to any suppression determination.
3. Gross Negligence/Criminal Negligence
The most interesting, most difficult, and most far-reaching standard
of culpability mentioned by the Supreme Court is gross negligence. As
a general matter, most constitutional violations would be better
characterized as negligent (gross or ordinary) rather than deliberate or
reckless, and thus understanding the floor set by this standard is
important.177
Ordinary civil negligence is differentiated from civil gross
negligence by the magnitude of the deviation from a reasonable
standard of care.178 In a civil case, one must claim a failure to live up to
the standard of reasonable care.179 While ordinary negligence has
different definitions, in general, it involves a failure to exercise
reasonable care.180 Civil gross negligence, by contrast, involves a gross
deviation from the standard of reasonable care.181 “Gross negligence has
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as ‘meaning a
‘virtual subjectivity’ that call for ‘speculati[on] about the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical
constable.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810
(1996)).
177. See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657–58 (1992) (finding government
negligence as a justification to dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily
assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct . . . .”).
178. See, e.g., Altman v. Aronson, 121 N.E. 505, 506 (Mass. 1919) (“Gross negligence is
substantially and appreciably higher in magnitude than ordinary negligence.”); Burk Royalty
Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex. 1981) (noting the distinction in severity between
ordinary negligence and gross negligence).
179. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (9th ed. 2009) (defining negligence as “[t]he failure
to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a
similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others
against unreasonable risk of harm”).
180. For example, Delaware tort law defines negligence as “the want of due care or want of
such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would exercise under similar
circumstances.” Orsini v. K-Mart Corp., No. 95C-07-146-WTQ, 1997 WL 528034, at *3 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1997) (citing Kane v. Reed, 101 A.2d 800, 801 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954)); see also cf.
Lee v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone LLP, 601 F.3d 654, 659 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Ohio tort law
defines negligence as the failure to conduct oneself as would ‘a reasonably prudent man in like
circumstances;’ and excludes from the definition of negligence ‘failing to take extraordinary
measures which hindsight demonstrates would have been helpful.’” (quoting Bender v. First
Church of Nazarene, 571 N.E.2d 475, 477 (1989))).
181. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 212 (W.
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (explaining gross negligence “as failure to exercise even that
care which a careless person would use” and noting that several courts “have construed gross
negligence as requiring willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct . . . . But it is still true that most
courts consider that ‘gross negligence’ falls short of a reckless disregard of the consequences,
and differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind.” (footnotes omitted)).
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greater want of care than is implied by the term ordinary
negligence.’”182 As one court described, gross negligence is defined as
“fail[ing] to observe even slight care” and “carelessness or recklessness
to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences that may
result.”183
Similarly, criminal negligence involves failing to perceive as
substantial and unjustifiable that risk will result from one’s actions.184 A
California court’s description in a homicide case of criminal negligence
serves as a colorful example:
[T]here must be a higher degree of negligence than is
required to establish negligent default on a mere civil issue.
The negligence must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or
reckless, that is, the conduct of the accused must be such a
departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily
prudent or careful [person] under the same circumstances
as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life,
or, in other words, a disregard of human life or an
indifference to the consequences.185
The Model Penal Code offers a more restrained and influential
definition that emphasizes that the individual should be aware of the
substantial and unjustifiable risk, and that a failure to see this risk
182. Blaine LeCesne, Crude Decisions: Re-examining Degrees of Negligence in the
Context of the BP Oil Spill, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 103, 129 (quoting Milwaukee & St. Paul
Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 495 (1875)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n v. Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 129
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted) (quoting Atkins Wright & Miles v. Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985)).
184. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4) (McKinney 2013) (“A person acts with criminal
negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an
offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur
or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the situation.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(10) (2011) (defining criminal negligence
as when “a person fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will
occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure
to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in the situation”).
185. People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926, 937 (Cal. 1955) (quoting 26 AM. JUR. Homicide § 210
(1940). The California jury instructions further explain “[c]riminal negligence involves more
than ordinary carelessness, inattention or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal
negligence when: 1. He or she acts in a reckless way that is a gross departure from the way an
ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation; 2. The person’s acts amount to
disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of his or her acts; [and] 3. A
reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would naturally and probably result
in harm to others.” JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS no. 821, at
538 (2013).
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involves a gross deviation from the standard of care of a reasonable
person.186 Other states have similar language.187 Criminal negligence,
like civil negligence, is also an objective standard.188 As Professor
Joshua Dressler states, “‘[N]egligence’ constitutes objective fault, i.e.,
an actor is not blamed for a wrongful state of mind, but instead is
punished for his failure to live up to the standards of the fictional
‘reasonable person.’”189 The difference between civil gross negligence
and criminal gross negligence (otherwise known as criminal negligence)
is complicated by the fact that no universal definition of civil gross
negligence exists.190
186. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d) (1962) (“A person acts negligently with respect to a
material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his
conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of
care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”).
187. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(4) (2013) (“[A] person acts with ‘criminal
negligence’ with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining
an offense when the person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result
will occur or that the circumstance exists; the risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the situation.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:12 (2013) (“Criminal
negligence exists when, although neither specific nor general criminal intent is present, there is
such disregard of the interest of others that the offender’s conduct amounts to a gross deviation
below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like
circumstances.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(10) (2011) (“‘Criminal negligence’ or ‘criminally
negligent,’ when used with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute
defining an offense, means that a person fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and
degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(b)(4)
(West 2013) (“A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when
he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will
result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to
perceive it, considering the nature and intent of his conduct and the circumstances known to
him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor’s situation.”).
188. John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 111, 123 n.73 (1996) (“The Model Penal Code terminology, for example, defines
negligence in objective terms, as contrasted with recklessness where subjective awareness is
required.”).
189. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10:04(D)(2), at 131 (5th ed.
2009).
190. LeCesne, supra note 182, at 129 (“Presently, and notwithstanding its ubiquitous
statutory usage, there is no generally accepted meaning of ‘gross negligence.’”); see also id.
(“One court even dubbed the task of assigning this higher level of culpability as akin to entering
a legal ‘twilight zone which exists somewhere between ordinary negligence and intentional
injury.’” (quoting Pleasant v. Johnson, 325 S.E.2d 244, 247 (N.C. 1985))); id. (“One of the most
widely accepted modern expressions of gross negligence suggests that it consists of two
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Applying a gross negligence standard in the exclusionary rule setting
presents several problems. First, courts must agree on a definition.
Second, a court would have to ask whether the officer’s actions
involved a substantial and unjustified risk of violating constitutional
rights. Third, the culpability determination would have to inquire into
whether the officer’s failure to perceive the risk justifies condemnation.
This inquiry would necessarily consider the surrounding circumstances
of why the officer failed to perceive the risk of harm to constitutional
rights. Thus, in the gross negligence area, courts would have to focus
more on why the officer failed to perceive the risk of unconstitutional
action rather than on the officer’s subjective thinking.
As a final point, one might ask how to evaluate Justice Alito’s
conception of “isolated negligence.”191 Why should an isolated mistake
not deserve some sanction? Again, there may be a difference in
interpretation between isolated civil negligence and isolated criminal
negligence, as it affects the level of culpability,192 but in reality both
isolated civil and criminal negligence are subject to legal liability. A
good faith failure to meet the standard of care is still a failure to meet
the standard of care. A negligent crime is still a crime. Interestingly, in
early decisions the Court appeared to recognize that mere negligence
could trigger the exclusionary rule.193
While legal commentators generally understand that the Court
appeared to borrow the civil tort standards (as opposed to criminal mens
rea standards) to guide the new exclusionary rule,194 the Court did not
components: (1) the view from the objective standpoint of the actor and (2) the actual,
subjective awareness of the risk involved and indifference to the welfare of others.”); see also,
e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(11) (West 2003) (“Gross negligence means
an act or omission . . . [that] when viewed objectively from the standpoint of the actor at the
time of its occurrence involves an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and
magnitude of the potential harm to others . . . of which the actor has actual, subjective awareness
of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeds with conscious indifference to the rights, safety,
or welfare of others.”).
191. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2011).
192. See supra Subsection II.A.3. The Court also muddied the idea of the good faith
exception. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 962 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Dery, supra note 33, at 19–26 (arguing that Davis’s narrow
focus on police culpability could cause the good faith exception to swallow the exclusionary
rule). For cases in which the police relied in good faith on their own police error, see Herring v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702–03 (2009); Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428 (“Police practices
trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield
‘meaningfu[l]’ deterrence, and culpable enough to be ‘worth the price paid by the justice
system.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702)).
193. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (“The deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least
negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.”).
194. See, e.g., Laurin, supra note 17, at 671–73.
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do so explicitly, and trial courts will be left to interpret these terms with
conflicting meanings. Though lower courts might vary in their
terminology and analytical framework, they will all have to incorporate
this culpability question into their suppression hearings. This is new and
uncharted territory and is the subject of Part III.
C. Definitional Questions: Attenuation
In Hudson, the Supreme Court gave new meaning to another legal
concept—attenuation. By doing so, the Court detached the concept of
attenuation from its origins in Brown v. Illinois and Wong Sun v. United
States.195 Prior to Hudson, certain constitutional violations did not result
in automatic exclusion if the constitutional wrong was attenuated from
the taint of the violation.196 For example, in Brown, the Court
considered several factors that might lead to attenuation.197
Considerations such as the temporal proximity between the illegal act
and acquisition of evidence, any intervening acts, and the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct all could factor into an attenuation
analysis.198 The key question was “whether, granting establishment of
the primary illegality, the evidence . . . has been come at by exploitation
of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint.”199 If there was sufficient attenuation, then
the evidence did not need to be suppressed.200
The attenuation doctrine in Hudson recalibrated this understanding.
Justice Scalia reasoned that exclusion must serve the interests protected
by the knock-and-announce rule.201 Decoupling the remedy from the
right and now requiring an inquiry into the purpose of the constitutional
protection adds new complexity to any exclusionary analysis.202 Taking
195. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600–
05 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963).
196. Tracey Maclin & Jennifer Rader, No More Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses
an Axe to Take Out the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 MISS. L.J. 1183, 1218 (2012)
(“During the 1960s and 1970s, attenuation analysis probed the strength of the connection
between the police illegality and the evidence the prosecutor wished to introduce by examining
the circumstances under which the evidence came into the hands of the police.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
197. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603–04.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 599 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487–88 (1963)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
200. See id. at 598–600.
201. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593–94 (2006) (noting that “[a]ttenuation also
occurs when, even given a direct causal connection, the interest protected by the constitutional
guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained”).
202. Sharon L. Davies & Anna B. Scanlon, Katz in the Age of Hudson v. Michigan: Some
Thoughts on “Suppression as a Last Resort,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1035, 1060 (2008) (“Prior
to Hudson, the attenuation doctrine had always probed the strength of the connection between
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Justice Scalia’s terminology as written, courts must now examine the
interests of the constitutional protections underlying constitutional
rights.203
As but one example, in a typical Fourth Amendment stop and frisk,
what are the interests being protected by the constitutional limits placed
on a police officer’s seizing an individual? Dignity?204 Privacy?205
Security?206 The right to be left alone?207 How are those interests
the police illegality and the evidence the prosecutor wished to introduce by examining the
circumstances under which the evidence came into the hands of the police. Thus, under the
attenuation doctrine, the Court has sometimes found suppression unnecessary where the causal
chain between a wrongful police act and the discovery of evidence had effectively been severed
by some significant intervening event, or the police illegality was so far removed from the
evidence it ultimately obtained, such as to question the deterrent value achieved by the
suppression of the evidence. The inquiry was into whether the evidence in question had ‘been
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint.’” (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592)); see also Tomkovicz, supra
note 71, at 1862–71 (discussing Hudson’s novel and potentially broad application of the existing
attenuation precedent).
203. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593–94; see Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and
Causation: Hudson v. Michigan and Its Ancestors, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1741, 1761–64 (2008)
(discussing which interests the knock-and-announce requirement serves as examined in
Hudson); George M. Dery, III, A False Mirror: Hudson v. Michigan’s Distortion of the
Exclusionary Rule in Knock-and-Announce Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 67, 89 (2007)
(discussing constitutional interests in relation to attenuation and the need for a relationship
between the penalty of exclusion and a violation of the knock-and-announce rule).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 730 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(noting that the abusive stop-and-frisk tactic risked eroding individual liberty and dignity); John
D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 655, 660–61
(noting that while underdeveloped in case law and scholarship, the concept of dignity “has
always existed around the periphery of constitutional search-and-seizure jurisprudence”);
Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of Privacy, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1249, 1276–
77 (2012) (“The history of the Fourth Amendment amply supports the notion that it protects
against the humiliation and loss of dignity wrought by unreasonable government searches and
seizures.”).
205. See, e.g., United States v. Coates, 495 F.2d 160, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting stop and
frisks are constitutional as long as they are reasonable based on a balancing test between
government interests and an individual’s interest in privacy); Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search?
Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 119, 120–26 (2002) (discussing “privacy” in the context of Fourth Amendment search
jurisprudence); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:
Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 129, 152 (2002)
(“Privacy is, however, more a matter of affect than cognition. Privacy is a set of metaphorical
boundaries that enables each of us to safeguard a sense of self. Privacy enables us to decide
which aspects of ourselves to reveal and to whom. That control matters deeply, because overly
selective exposure of ourselves to others will lead to their misjudging our nature.”).
206. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (noting that in the context of stop and frisks,
the question “is whether in all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, [the
petitioner’s] right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure”
(emphasis added)); see also Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect:
Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 351–66 (1998) (discussing the
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balanced with stopping crime? Solving crime? Ensuring social order? A
brief review of the scholarly literature on police–citizen Fourth
Amendment encounters illustrates the problems with judging the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.208
The exclusionary remedy, of course, applies not just to police–
citizen street encounters but to all types of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment violations, as well as various due process issues.209 To
determine if exclusion would serve the purposes of the constitutional
right, the purpose behind each right would have to be evaluated,
debated, and decided. As Part III discusses, this language leaves many
difficult questions for lawyers litigating these issues.
D. Application Questions: Constitutional Culpability
Two significant questions remain about how to apply the Supreme
Court’s new exclusionary rule. The first concerns the future Herring–
Davis question: whether the Supreme Court will be willing to extend its
new exclusionary reasoning to nonculpable police officers who make an
error of constitutional magnitude.210 The simplest and most common
Framers’ understanding of security in relation to the Fourth Amendment and its modern day
conception). But see Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008)
(“The Fourth Amendment does not guarantee a right of privacy. It guarantees—if its actual
words mean anything—a right of security.”).
207. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“[The drafters of the Constitution] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
208. Scholars argue that a host of values, such as dignity, respect, trust, security, power,
and social control, are the true purpose of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray
Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological
Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002) (“The Fourth Amendment protects power not
privacy.”); Jeremy M. Miller, Dignity as a New Framework, Replacing the Right to Privacy, 30
T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (“The eternal right, beyond technology and corrupt
government, corporation, or individual, is dignity.”); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1751, 1775 (1994) (“Developments such as growing government regulation, and expanding
technological capacity, however, have robbed the ‘right to be let alone’ of much of its power to
control the legal discourse concerning the Fourth Amendment.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect
and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 23 (2003) (“The Fourth
Amendment protects core interests essential to human flourishing, interests in privacy, property,
and freedom of movement.”).
209. See William A. Davis, The Impeachment Amendment Exception to the Sixth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 176, 180–83 (1987) (discussing the
exclusionary rule’s permeation throughout Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment as well as
Miranda jurisprudence).
210. To be clear, this is the next logical step from Herring. Instead of a police employee,
the police officer himself or herself makes the mistake. Thus, there is no separation from
wrongdoing and no good faith reliance on another entity.
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example would be if a police officer erroneously believes he has
reasonable suspicion to seize or probable cause to search. There is a
constitutional wrong, and the question would be whether the remedy of
exclusion is available for this (intentional, reckless, grossly negligent, or
negligent) mistake. Extending the Herring–Davis logic, the lack of
culpability could mean that there would be no automatic exclusion.211
The result potentially would necessitate a two-tiered suppression
hearing in which courts are called upon to judge both the constitutional
violation and the appropriate exclusionary remedy.212
How this two-tiered suppression hearing would work is not yet
known. As the next Part discusses, the questions that need to be
answered to determine culpability and exclusion are not the same as
those needed to determine whether a constitutional violation existed in
the first instance.213 To evaluate culpability, should a court hold a
separate hearing or allow cross-examination and evidence during the
actual suppression hearing? Can the two steps happen simultaneously?
What rules of evidence, discovery, or expert testimony should govern?
These are questions courts will have to address before hearing evidence
on even the most basic suppression hearing.
The second question is the “Hudson question,” which asks whether
Justice Scalia meant what he said—that the constitutional wrong must
not be attenuated from the underlying constitutional interests.214 While
such a distinction perhaps makes sense in the knock-and-announce
context, it is much more difficult to determine the underlying
constitutional interests in a stop-and-frisk case or for a search without
probable cause. Or, under the Fifth Amendment, is the purpose of
Miranda education, notice, fairness, protection, coercion, autonomy, or
something else?215 While this language has dropped out of the analysis
in the post-Hudson, Herring, and Davis cases, it remains a potential
argument to further complicate the application of the exclusionary rule.
211. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009); Davis v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011).
212. Craig M. Bradley, Reconceiving the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 73
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 231 (2010) (“Now the Court is proposing to engage in a two-part
inquiry in every case, considering first whether there was a breach and second whether the level
of police culpability was reckless or systematic.”).
213. See infra Part III. The constitutional violation can be determined without delving into
the officer’s intent or an objective culpability determination. In fact, Whren holds that the
subjective intent of the officer is irrelevant to determine the constitutional violation. See infra
notes 269–70 and accompanying text.
214. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592–93 (2006).
215. See Sharon L. Davies, Some Reflections on the Implications of Hudson v. Michigan
for the Law of Confessions, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1207, 1233–34 (2007) (discussing how
Hudson may have opened the door for “Miranda-defective statements” to avoid automatic
suppression).
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As the next Part discusses, the Roberts Court’s new standard opens
up novel arguments for litigants and challenges for courts. Several
unexamined and perhaps unintended effects will result as the language
and logic of the opinions are litigated.
III. NEW STANDARDS FOR EXCLUSION:
NEW LITIGATION QUESTIONS
Because of the uncertain doctrinal framework, this new standard for
exclusion presents emerging challenges for lawyers. The goal of this
Part is to translate legal theory into practical considerations useful to
those litigating Fourth Amendment issues.
This Part focuses on the future Herring–Davis question not yet
answered by the Supreme Court.216 The open question is what happens
if the police officers themselves make a constitutional mistake.217 Can a
court deny the exclusionary remedy because the mistake was isolated,
negligent, in good faith, or not “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systematic
negligence”?218 The answer will determine whether the exclusionary
rule has any life left.
A. Strategic Denial: Concerning Dicta in Herring and Davis
For defense lawyers facing the new exclusionary rule, the first
option is to ignore Herring and Davis. The tactic of strategic denial
exists because the Court’s language, although forceful, was unnecessary
to the holdings in Herring and Davis. Thus, the first question is whether
to accept the Court’s new standard as dicta.219
Lawyers who choose the “denial approach” will argue for the
narrowest interpretation of the Court’s holdings and reject outright the
strong language limiting the exclusionary remedy.220 As a matter of
blackletter law, the denial approach is supportable.221 Dicta, which is
216. The concern is not on cases with facts similar to Herring or Davis, which involved
bureaucratic negligence or reliance on appellate holdings, as precedent now controls those cases.
217. See Marceau, supra note 142, at 742–54 (discussing mistake of law and mistake of
fact by police officers after Herring).
218. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009).
219. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 519 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “dictum” as “[a] statement of
opinion or belief considered authoritative because of the dignity of the person making it”).
220. Moran, supra note 7, at 376 (“Chief Justice Roberts used his Herring majority opinion
in an attempt to engraft a brand new, officer-culpability requirement onto the exclusionary rule.
Only deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct by individual officers would require
exclusion; mere ordinary negligence would not. Never mind that this discussion was dicta since
the line between ordinary negligence and gross negligence was not at issue in Herring, and
never mind that the opinion made no serious effort to explain the difference in the context of a
typical Fourth Amendment violation.” (footnote omitted)).
221. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
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language not essential to deciding the case and controversy before the
court, is not binding.222 Further, the dissenting justices in Herring and
Davis avoided characterizing the majority’s reasoning as a holding.223
Thus, applied to the future Herring–Davis question about whether an
officer’s own constitutional violation requires suppression, the cases
offer no prescribed answer.
First, in Herring there was no reason to address the level of
culpability of the arresting officers because all parties agreed that the
officers had acted reasonably.224 The controlling issue was not whether
a police clerk acted negligently, but whether the police officers acted
reasonably in relying on the report of an arrest warrant.225 The arresting
officers made no error (negligent, reckless, grossly negligent, or
otherwise) because they were following the information provided by the
clerk.226 While the Court’s statement of a new standard about when the
exclusionary remedy should apply was forcefully presented,227 the
Court had no reason to apply the new standard to the facts.228
The facts of Davis provide an even less appropriate situation to
evaluate culpability, because all parties agreed that the officers were not
only reasonable, but actually followed the established law.229 There was
simply no need to inquire into the level of negligence as opposed to
recklessness or any other level of culpability. Yet, Justice Alito
1056–58 (2005) (discussing the distinction between a holding and dicta); Marc McAllister,
Dicta Redefined, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 161, 165–69 (2011) (discussing that dicta is
traditionally not binding in the same manner as a holding).
222. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006) (“It is a maxim not to be
disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the
case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but
ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for
decision.” (quoting Cohens v. Virgina, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821))).
223. Moran, supra note 7, at 365 (“To put it simply, the language in Herring limiting the
exclusionary rule to violations committed by grossly negligent (or worse) police officers looks
like dicta. The four justices in dissent in Herring were careful not to refer to the culpability
language in the majority opinion as a holding.”).
224. Id. at 376.
225. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701–02 (2009).
226. Id. at 695, 699 (citing the Eleventh Circuit’s finding that “the arresting officers in
Coffee County ‘were entirely innocent of any wrongdoing or carelessness’” (quoting United
States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1218 (2007))).
227. Id. at 701–03 (discussing the culpability standard for police officers under the
exclusionary rule).
228. The case would have been more difficult if the arresting officer knew that the record
system had not been updated and was not sure that there was a real warrant but wanted to arrest
Herring anyway. In this circumstance, the court’s exploration into culpability would make a lot
more sense.
229. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) (“[A]ll agree that the officers’
conduct was in strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in any
way.”).
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borrowed the reasoning of Herring and its newly developed standard
without any real need for application.230
That the Supreme Court has expressed a forceful idea about the
limits of the exclusionary rule does not mean that trial courts are
listening. The writing may be on the wall, but it has to be read (and
accepted) for it to mean anything. Thus, one avenue open for litigators
is to distinguish the existing precedent and to argue that the controlling
weight of Herring and Davis is limited to the facts presented. Until the
Supreme Court decides a case about the constitutional error of an officer
making a misjudgment of a constitutional magnitude, the denial
approach is still available for argument.
B. Acceptance: New Avenues for Litigation
The new culpability-focused standard raises new considerations and
concerns for courts at the trial level. These issues were not present
under the traditional exclusionary rule regime, which did not focus on
“constitutional blame.” In fact, it seems likely that the Supreme Court
failed to consider the practical, trial-level consequences of its
reasoning.231 Trial courts facing these questions and litigators making
tactical choices must now rethink how the exclusionary rule operates.
This section addresses ten possible consequences that result from the
Hudson-Herring-Davis trilogy.
1. The Problem of Litigating Police Culpability
To frame the analysis, it is helpful to consider a typical scenario that
raises a stark Herring–Davis question.232 Take as an example a few fact
patterns that have emerged from the routine stop-and-frisk practices in
New York City.233 The New York Police Department (NYPD) has made
over a half-million documented Terry stops a year.234 Many of those
230. Id. at 2427–28.
231. See id. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
232. The generic version of this problem would involve, for example, a police officer who
observes activity that causes him to investigate a suspect. Based on nothing more than a hunch,
he stops a man. Based on the man’s reaction, the officer searches the man. Incident to the
search, contraband is recovered. At the suppression hearing, the judge finds that the stop was
without reasonable suspicion and the search without probable cause.
233. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment:
Redrawing “High Crime Areas,” 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 214–15 (2011) (describing stop-andfrisk practices in New York City).
234. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 30–31 (1968) (holding that stop-and-frisk searches
are appropriate when the police officer acts reasonably); Russ Buettner & William Glaberson,
Courts Putting Stop-and-Frisk Policy on Trial, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/nyregion/courts-putting-stop-and-frisk-policy-on-trial.html;
Editorial, Lingering Questions About Stop and Frisk, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.
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stops were made without reasonable suspicion and were thus
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.235 Many of those stops
also involved un-Mirandized custodial interrogations.236 Two real-life
examples, documented in testimony and evaluated by federal judge
Shira Scheindlin overseeing the lawsuits, provides context for this
analysis.237 While these stories arose in a civil context in which the
parties sought preliminary injunctions, these events could easily arise in
suppression hearings involving Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues.
Because of the extensive testimony concerning the officers’
justifications for the stops and the judge’s credibility findings, the
stories have sufficient detail to permit analysis of whether exclusion
would be required under the new standard.
a. Charles Bradley’s Stop
Charles Bradley was a fifty-one-year-old security guard and a
resident of the Bronx.238 He went to visit his fiancée at her apartment. A
resident who knew him and his relationship with his fiancée let him into
the apartment building.239 The fiancée, who was deaf in one ear, did not
open the apartment door, and so Mr. Bradley went back outside. While
he was standing on the sidewalk outside the apartment building, an
unmarked police van arrived. One of the police officers gestured for
Bradley to come over. Police then questioned Bradley about possible
com/2010/02/19/opinion/19fri3.html; Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police
Stops, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/nyregion/12frisk.html;
cf. Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Deals Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/nyregion/in-the-bronx-resistance-to-prosecutingstop-and-frisk-arrests.html; see also New Yorkers Speak Out on Stop, Question and Frisk Policy,
N.Y. TIMES (August 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/08/21/nyregion/stopand-frisk-voices.html (polling 1,000 people on their opinion of stop and frisk in New York
City).
235. See infra notes 248–249, 262 and accompanying text; see also Floyd v. City of N.Y.,
959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. N.Y. 2013) (judging the constitutionality of the NYPD stop-and-frisk
practices).
236. See infra note 265 and accompanying text. Many of the stops involved police
questioning after an unconstitutional seizure. Again, the Miranda violation only occurs if the
statements are used in trial. See infra note 265–66 and accompanying text.
237. See Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 483–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (lawsuit
challenging the “Trespass Affidavit Program,” which involved police stops outside private
apartment buildings on the suspicion of trespass); see also Davis v. New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d
405, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (suit against the New York Public Housing Authority challenging the
policies and practices that the police department and the housing authority used to enforce
prohibitions against trespassing on public housing property); Floyd v. City of N.Y., 813 F. Supp.
2d 417, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (lawsuit challenging New York City police’s “policy, practice,
and/or custom of unconstitutional stops and frisks . . . on the basis of race and/or national
origin”).
238. Ligon, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
239. Id.
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criminal activities and contraband.240 He denied knowing anything, but
the police searched him and arrested him for trespassing.241 Bradley was
taken to the police station in the van, questioned again about unrelated
criminal activity, strip-searched, booked for trespass, detained, and then
released.242 Bradley insisted he had done nothing wrong. The
prosecutors’ office dismissed the charges after Bradley’s lawyer
provided an affidavit from the fiancée.243
In contrast to Bradley’s version of events, Officer Santiago, the
arresting officer, testified that the apartment at issue was a high-crime,
high-drug area with many reported robberies and shootings.244 He
testified that he observed Bradley at the end of the hallway inside the
building “suspiciously walking back and forth for two or three minutes
and disappearing.”245 The trial judge discredited this testimony because
Officer Santiago would have had to make these alleged observations
from a vantage point with an obstructed line-of-sight of Bradley.246
Officer Santiago testified that he inquired about Bradley’s reason for
being at the building, and arrested him for criminal trespass because he
was unsatisfied with Bradley’s answers. Officer Santiago denied the
custodial questioning and strip search.247
The trial judge credited Bradley’s version of events and found
Officer Santiago’s testimony to be contradicted by other evidence,
including several factual inconsistencies and false statements.248 The
trial judge determined that there was no reasonable suspicion for the
stop.249

240. Id. at 497–98.
241. Id. These types of trespassing arrests were the center of the “Clean Halls” lawsuit at
issue in the Ligon litigation. Id. at 484.
242. Id. at 498.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 498–99.
246. Id. at 499. Officer Santiago would have made these observations from the police van,
which was parked across the street almost thirty feet from the front door. Id. Further, his view
would have been obstructed by the door, the entryway, and a hallway. Id.
247. Id. at 498–99.
248. Id. at 499 (“The paperwork Officer Santiago completed with regard to Bradley’s stop
and arrest contained numerous, self-serving errors. In direct contradiction to his testimony at the
hearing, Officer Santiago made the following statements on the arrest fact sheet: first, that he
observed Bradley in the building for seven minutes; second, that he stopped Bradley inside the
building; third, that he went to the apartment Bradley said he was visiting; and fourth, that the
apartment was occupied. By all accounts, each of these statements was false. Officer Santiago’s
credibility was further called into question by the fact that in 2002 or 2003 he lied within the
scope of his police work by creating two improper summonses to help a friend.” (footnotes
omitted)).
249. Id.
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b. Abdullah Turner’s Stop
Abdullah Turner was a twenty-four-year-old man who visited a close
friend in the Bronx.250 On the way to an engagement party, Mr. Turner
and his friend stopped by another friend’s house to return a sweater.251
Turner remained outside the apartment talking on the phone while the
friend went into the apartment to return the sweater.252 As he walked
outside, a police officer snatched Turner’s phone from his ear and asked
him to provide identification and to explain what he was doing in the
area. Turner was seized and questioned about criminal wrongdoing.253
Despite providing identification and explaining his reason for waiting
outside, Turner had his phone taken, and was arrested for criminal
trespass.254 He was booked and spent the night in a holding cell.255
Defending his actions, Officer Ramdeen, the arresting officer,
testified that he saw Turner pacing aimlessly in the lobby for several
minutes.256 When Turner exited the apartment building, Officer
Ramdeen inquired about his purpose and Turner allegedly stated his
friend was in the building trying to buy marijuana.257 The officer then
arrested him for trespassing because he had no legitimate purpose in the
building.258
The trial judge credited Turner’s testimony.259 The judge found that
“Turner’s responses to the officers’ questions were reasonable and
unsuspicious.”260 The judge discredited the confession and found no
grounds for suspicion or for the stop.261
c. The Problem Reconsidered
In the above examples, the judge disbelieved the police officers’
testimony and found no reasonable suspicion for the stops.262 Had these
cases arisen in a suppression hearing, the judge would likely have found
the police officers’ actions unreasonable and thus unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment.263 Under the old exclusionary rule, any
250. Id. at 499–500.
251. Id. at 500.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 501.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 502.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 499, 502.
263. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 608–09 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In Weeks,
Silverthorne, and Mapp, the Court based its holdings requiring suppression of unlawfully
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recovered contraband would be subject to exclusion.264 In addition, both
individuals were subjected to un-Mirandized custodial interrogations
that potentially violated the Fifth Amendment.265 Again, under the old
exclusionary rule, if the defendant made statements during
unconstitutional interrogation and the government tried to use such
statements during its case-in-chief at trial, then the court would exclude
these statements.
Under the new culpability-centered rule, however, exclusion is not
automatic.266 Now, a court must consider whether exclusion will deter
future constitutional violations, and if so, whether the action of that
particular officer was deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent, or
involved recurring or systemic negligence.267 As the next few
subsections discuss, these new questions involve consideration of the
particular police officer’s intent, knowledge, and experience, and the
larger issues of a police department’s institutional practices—factors
that courts did not have to consider under the old exclusionary rule.
This, in turn, opens up questions about the need to obtain that
information through discovery, pretrial disclosure, and crossexamination. The following nine subsections address the new litigation
considerations arising from this new exclusionary rule framework.
2. Litigating Culpability
Under the traditional exclusionary rule, there existed no opportunity
or need to assess an officer’s blameworthiness in violating
constitutional rights.268 The Supreme Court stated in Whren v. United
States that the subjective beliefs of the arresting officer are irrelevant for

obtained evidence upon the recognition that admission of that evidence would seriously
undermine the Fourth Amendment’s promise. All three cases recognized that failure to apply the
exclusionary rule would make that promise a hollow one . . . .”).
264. United States. v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1951).
265. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463–65 (1966). Again, the violation would occur
only if the statement was used against the defendant in the government’s case-in-chief at trial.
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2004).
266. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009).
267. See id. at 701–02; United States v. Voustianiouk, 685 F.3d 206, 215–16 (2d Cir. 2012)
(holding that in failing to obtain a new warrant to search the second-floor apartment, law
enforcement was “sufficiently deliberate” in its actions to meet the Herring standard); Virgin
Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 412, 417–18 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that an improvidently issued
warrant where no probable cause for a search existed constituted sufficient “deliberate, reckless
or grossly negligent” actions to establish Herring and Davis culpability and activate the
exclusionary rule).
268. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (“Our cases make clear that an
arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence
of probable cause.” (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996))).
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Fourth Amendment purposes.269 To determine the constitutional
violation, courts were to follow an objective standard, and since the
exclusionary remedy was linked to the violation, it too was controlled
by an objective standard.270 Whether evil or inadvertent, the
constitutional wrong and constitutional remedy turned on
reasonableness, not blameworthiness.271
Under a new culpability-centered standard, the objective nature of
the analysis is not so clear-cut. To determine whether the officers in our
two scenarios acted deliberately, recklessly, or whether the officers’
actions were part of a recurring systemic problem, the officers’ decision
making becomes relevant.272 In simple terms, how do we know if
Officer Santiago’s or Officer Ramdeen’s actions were blameworthy
without analyzing either the officers’ knowledge of constitutional rules
or their particular experience, including past violations of constitutional
rights?273 If an officer regularly decided to ignore the reasonable
suspicion standard, this might result in a different outcome than if the
officer merely misunderstood the doctrine in practice.274 Similarly,
269. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he constitutional reasonableness of [a] traffic stop[]
[does not] depend[] on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”). In fact, a
reasonable police officer standard was rejected in Whren. The Supreme Court criticized
subjective tests, complaining that they were “exercise[s]” in “virtual subjectivity” that call for
“speculati[on] about the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical constable.” Id. at 814–15 (“[I]t
seems to us somewhat easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb the
collective consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine whether a ‘reasonable
officer’ would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation.”).
270. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); cf. McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (holding that the Fourth Amendment cannot be violated in “the
absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the
constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative”);
Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (holding that although
knowledge gained by the government’s own wrong cannot be used before a court, knowledge
gained from independent sources may be brought before a court like any other); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
271. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153 (holding that the arresting officer’s state of mind is
irrelevant).
272. Herring, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702–03.
273. The difficulty of determining deliberateness is evident in some of the Court’s earliest
cases. For example, in Brewer v. Williams the majority had little difficulty stating that police
deliberately elicited an incriminating statement in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See 430
U.S. 387, 399 (1977) (“There can be no serious doubt, either, that Detective Leaming
deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from Williams just as surely as—and
perhaps more effectively than—if he had formally interrogated him.”). Yet the dissenting
Justices argued that “[t]he police did nothing ‘wrong,’ let alone anything ‘unconstitutional.’”
See id. at 438 (White, J., dissenting).
274. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 342 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Courts have
frequently taken the ‘purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct’ into account in
considering whether the taint of illegal action was sufficiently dissipated to render a confession
admissible. In part, this inquiry has reflected conviction that particularly egregious misconduct
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different outcomes might result between a case involving an officer who
previously had evidence suppressed under similar circumstances and
one involving an officer who had never been in that situation. Further,
how do we know about recurring or systemic negligence without
investigating past actions of the officers?
Applying the mens rea terminology supplied by the Court in Herring
and Davis, the first question is whether the officers deliberately stopped
the individuals without reasonable suspicion. Presumably, there would
not be any testimony that the actions were deliberate violations of the
Constitution. But, can a judge who discredits an officer’s statements
infer a deliberate violation based on untruthfulness? What if the officer
testifies to an honest but mistaken understanding of trespass law? Is this
reckless or grossly negligent? How does the pattern and practice of the
other stops factor into a court’s analysis?
These questions arise from the doctrinal uncertainty, which may in
fact be useful for trial lawyers (especially defense counsel) to explore.
Specifically, as will be discussed, new areas of cross-examination and
argument are now open to determine the particular officer’s knowledge
and experience. Similarly, the police department’s training on
constitutional standards (in general) and the police officer’s training (in
particular) now become subject to investigation. Each of these questions
is addressed in turn.
3. Litigating Knowledge
As Justice Roberts recognized in Herring, an officer’s particular
knowledge of the law is relevant to the good-faith inquiry.275 To
determine culpability, courts must first determine what a reasonable law
enforcement officer knows about the Constitution (e.g., the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement of reasonable suspicion), then determine
what this particular officer knows, and, finally, compare the objective
actions of the officer against these two benchmarks of officer

must be deterred through particularly stern action.” (citation omitted) (citing Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975))); Kinports, supra note 107, at 775 (“Using the culpability rubric, an
officer who proceeds to frisk a suspect without any belief that the suspect is armed is clearly
acting with a culpability greater than negligence. The limitations of Terry are well known, and a
police officer who conducts a frisk to uncover evidence or out of habit—and with no fear for her
safety—cannot be considered merely negligent.” (footnotes omitted)).
275. Herring, 129 S. Ct. 695 at 703 (“We have already held that ‘our good-faith inquiry is
confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer
would have known that the search was illegal’ in light of ‘all of the circumstances.’ These
circumstances frequently include a particular officer’s knowledge and experience, but that does
not make the test any more subjective than the one for probable cause, which looks to an
officer’s knowledge and experience.” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984))).
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knowledge.276 These additional steps were all unnecessary under the old
exclusionary rule regime.277
Going back to the two examples that begin this Part, a police officer
stops a suspect based on an erroneous hunch (or no hunch) and then
conducts a search. First, courts must now inquire about what a
reasonable law enforcement officer knows about the Fourth
Amendment.278 One might assume as a default that a reasonable police
officer would know of current Fourth Amendment developments
through professional training and experience.279 A responsible law
enforcement officer should know that an unsubstantiated hunch is
insufficient justification for a stop and that an officer needs probable
cause for a full search.280 Similarly, one might assume that a reasonable
police officer would know that custodial interrogation requires Miranda
warnings or the resulting statements will be inadmissible.281
The second step would be an inquiry into what this particular police
officer knows about the Fourth Amendment (as compared to the
reasonable police officer).282 This inquiry will require the police officer
to demonstrate some familiarity with basic search and seizure law.283
Unless we expect police officers to be legally trained, however, any
276. Id. at 701–03.
277. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
278. Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance
Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1529 n.226
(2009) (“In the law-enforcement context, courts assess reasonable suspicion and probable cause
based on a ‘reasonable officer’ standard. Such a standard considers the training and experience
of the officer in determining whether there was sufficient indication that ‘criminal activity may
be afoot.’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968))); see also United States v. Salazar,
609 F.3d 1059, 1065 (10th Cir. 2010) (“In other Fourth Amendment applications of the
reasonable officer standard, we have characterized that reasonable officer as ‘prudent, cautious
and trained.’” (quoting United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2001))).
279. See United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]here is no
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for police who do not act in accordance with
governing law. To create an exception here would defeat the purpose of the exclusionary rule,
for it would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they properly understand the
law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.”); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1470
(9th Cir. 1986) (noting that it is not unreasonable to require law enforcement officers to know
well-established current laws); Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d 442, 447 (Fla. 1992) (“Law
enforcement officers are charged with knowledge of the law.”); see also Marceau, supra note
141, 743 n.277 (2011) (discussing the Lopez-Soto holding).
280. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
123–24 (2000) (“The officer must be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or “hunch”’ of criminal activity.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27)).
281. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464–65 (1966).
282. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 703 (2009).
283. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV.
881, 896 (1991) (recognizing that police officers receive some Fourth Amendment training at
the time they join the force, as well as further training through on-the-job experience).
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further inquiry may be slightly unfair to officers because they would
now be required to provide a legal justification for their stop and
interrogation tactics, not just recite the facts of the stop.284 While
difficult, this step may now be necessary. To prove a deliberate
violation, one must first establish that the officer knew the law and
intentionally violated it. To prove a reckless violation, one must
establish the officer’s awareness of the risk of violating the
Constitution, which again requires some analysis of the officer’s
knowledge of the Constitution.285
The third step would be to compare the reasonable officer standard
to the particular officer in question and decide how this knowledge
should affect the overall culpability analysis.286 This last step offers
another level of complexity. A knowledgeable officer may be more
culpable than an innocently ignorant officer. A willfully ignorant officer
may be more reckless than an innocently ignorant officer. A truly
ignorant officer may be, in fact, reckless in that lack of knowledge.
For defense counsel, this new focus on knowledge requires a threefold inquiry in every suppression hearing. Counsel would inquire about
general Fourth Amendment awareness of “reasonable police officers,”
the particular standards and training of this officer287 and the officer’s
police department,288 and then argue that the officer’s conduct did not
match that of a reasonable officer. In the examples discussed above, this
would involve cross-examination into the particular constitutional
knowledge of the arresting officers. One could imagine a line of crossexamination involving the officer’s knowledge of recent Fourth
284. See, e.g., Recent Case, Fourth Amendment—Qualified Immunity—Third Circuit Holds
that Police Officer’s Good Faith Reliance on Legal Advice Creates a Presumption of
Reasonableness.—Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010), 124 HARV. L.
REV. 2083, 2087–88 (2011) (“Although the doctrine of qualified immunity assumes that
government officials are aware of clearly established law, there is a tension between the
reasonableness of expecting that police officers ‘know the basic elements of the laws they
enforce’ and the unfairness of requiring that they ‘be as conversant in the law as lawyers and
judges who have the benefit not only of formal legal training, but also the advantage of
deliberate study.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 255,
258 (3d Cir. 2010))).
285. See supra Subsections II.B.1–2.
286. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703. Complicating this analysis are credibility questions,
which may be quite distinct from the knowledge issues. For example, in our two examples, the
trial court disbelieved the officer’s testimony. Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 499,
502 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). To determine whether the officer intentionally or negligently arrested the
men in the absence of any truthful testimony on which to base a decision is a rather difficult
situation for the court.
287. For defense counsel this line of questioning might involve asking about any additional
legal training the officer received.
288. For defense counsel this line of questioning might involve asking questions about
training on legal issues provided by the police department, including training at the police
academy and other additional in service trainings.
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Amendment precedent, the law of trespass, the factors for reasonable
suspicion, and legal conclusions reached from this understanding.
Presumably, in New York City, these questions would include
discussion of the federal lawsuits against the police department and data
challenging the stop-and-frisk policy.289 Similarly, the legal rules of
custody, interrogation, and Miranda protections for suspects subject to
custodial interrogation might be avenues of inquiry.290
For prosecutors, the focus on the particular officer’s knowledge may
provide an opportunity to strengthen the constitutional argument at the
suppression hearing. While not without risks, because the constitutional
analysis and discussion is being generated by a non-lawyer, allowing
the police officer to explain why he or she thought the stop was
constitutional provides another argument to the court about the stop’s
legitimacy. Normally, officers testify to the facts while the lawyers and
judge apply the facts to the law. Under the new process, the officer—
through direct examination—would have the opportunity to explain his
or her view of the law as it fits the facts at issue.291 This presents a
potential benefit for a prosecutor with a sophisticated police witness.
While this inquiry by both the defense and the prosecution are new
steps in the process, they may not result in a different outcome. The
final determination of objective culpability is with the judge, who must
determine whether the officer’s actions under the Fourth Amendment
conform to what a reasonable officer would do.292 In this way, the judge
will determine whether the culpability warrants suppression by
comparing the officer’s actual action to the actions that a reasonable
officer would have taken. This is a new process that may ultimately lead
to the exact same result.
4. Litigating Prior Experience
The prior experience of the particular officer also now becomes an
issue in determining culpability. As Justice Alito stated in Davis,
suppression is unwarranted when police officers believe, based on an
“objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful,
or when their conduct involves only simple, ‘isolated’ negligence.”293
289. See supra notes 234, 237 (discussing the federal lawsuits in New York City for stopand-frisk practices).
290. These questions might include inquiries into the training on Miranda practices,
interrogation tactics, etc.
291. In many ways this process might be objected to because it would bolster the
prosecution’s case. Under the new exclusionary rules, however, it would seem that this type of
inquiry is now permissible. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
292. See supra note 286 and accompanying text. The final decision or result of the court
does not change, but only the inputs that go into that decision.
293. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2011) (citation omitted).
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As discussed above, the first part focuses on knowledge, the latter part
on the experience of the particular officer. How can a court determine if
the constitutional violation was “isolated” without evaluating the other
similarly situated situations? Does the inquiry now require investigation
into previous similar stops?294 Does the fact that a court has found
previous stops unconstitutional become relevant?295 What if the police
officer is notorious for illegal stop and frisks?296 Or the police unit?297
Or the Department?298 What if the officer is under investigation for
disciplinary violations concerning stop and frisks? Under the traditional
suppression regime, such questions were irrelevant.299 Now, these
questions may be critical to determining if the unconstitutional action
was isolated or part of a recurring pattern.
294. Interestingly, the data-driven nature of police work, with required documentation of
all stops and contacts, may make this inquiry fairly easy. In some jurisdictions, every contact
with citizens is supposed to be documented in formal reports. Thus, this database includes all of
the reported stops, the justifications, and the results. This data could be used in Fourth
Amendment litigation. See, e.g., SARAH V. HART, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME SCENE
INVESTIGATION: A REFERENCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING 1 (June 2004),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/200160.pdf (“Critical to the administration of a crime is the
objective recognition, documentation, collection, preservation, and transmittal of physical
evidence for analysis.”).
295. Courts have found that prior police experience is relevant in justifying a stop. See,
e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (recognizing that “a police officer
views the facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise”); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (establishing that “due weight must be given . . . to the specific reasonable
inferences which [the officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience”).
Logically, a police officer’s prior failure to justify a stop should also be relevant.
296. See Jason Cherkis, Rough Justice, WASH. CITY PAPER (Jan. 7, 2000),
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/18752/rough-justice (describing the tactics of four
police officers who were known for frequently bending the law).
297. Scandals like the Rampart scandal in the Los Angeles Police Department provide
cautionary lessons. See Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Rampart Case Takes On Momentum of Its
Own, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1999/dec/31/news/mn-49335
(discussing the “Pandora’s box of alleged police crimes and misconduct” of the Los Angeles
Police Department’s Rampart Division); Henry Weinstein, Rampart Probe May Now Affect
Over 3,000 Cases, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1999/dec/15/
news/mn-44050 (discussing the years and substantial resources needed to unravel the Rampart
scandal). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police
Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545
(2001) (describing the tolerated aggressive policing culture, departmental structure, disciplinary
system, and its handling of excessive force cases as problems that plagued the Los Angeles
Police Department); In the News: Rampart Scandal, L.A. TIMES (last visited Feb. 7, 2014),
http://articles.latimes.com/keyword/rampart-scandal (search of the L.A. Times’s archive for
articles on the Rampart scandal).
298. See Graham Rayman, The NYPD Police Tapes: Inside Bed-Stuy’s 81st Precinct,
VILLAGE VOICE (May 4, 2010), http://www.villagevoice.com/2010-05-04/news/the-nypd-tapesinside-bed-stuy-s-81st-precinct/full (describing the pressure facing officers to manufacture
statistics to support the numbers-driven stop-and-frisk program).
299. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996).
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Certainly, an officer’s prior discipline on past stops might have a
bearing on the officer’s level of deliberateness or recklessness.300 In
fact, in discrediting Officer Santiago, the trial court referenced a prior
disciplinary report.301 If a court finds the officer had been involved in
ten prior stops without reasonable suspicion, this information should
factor into evaluating the eleventh stop. If an officer had been
disciplined because of prior inattention to constitutional restraints, this
fact would bear on the isolated nature of the constitutional wrong. At
the same time, if an officer had a long history of lawful, constitutional
stops, this too would be relevant for the prosecutor to introduce to
bolster the officer’s record. As might be imagined, this history of prior
conduct will present a real difficulty for courts in terms of time,
expense, and confusion.
Presumably, courts will be quite reluctant to allow mini-hearings
into the history of a particular officer’s negligent actions or past
experience. Yet, that is exactly the process that seems to be suggested
by the Supreme Court’s culpability-centered focus. Defense counsel
will begin questioning officers on past acts. The questioning will in turn
require courts to make decisions about the scope and extent of crossexamination. For example, in the Ligon litigation,302 should prior
trespass arrests be relevant? What about prior stops? What about
testimony from citizens who claim to have been stopped by this
particular officer?
Similarly, prosecutors will also seek to bolster the professionalism of
their testifying police witnesses. While before, past experience was
irrelevant to whether the officer acted within constitutional constraints,
a pattern of professional action free from disciplinary concerns now
may be a relevant factor in a culpability analysis. Showing a pattern of
constitutional practice may counteract the defense’s attempt to show a
pattern of violations. The result, even when focused on the individual
officer, offers a new and complex inquiry.
5. Litigating Institutional Wrongdoing
In addition to inviting an inquiry into the training and past acts of the
particular officer, the Supreme Court’s new standard also opens the
door to questioning institutional policies and practices. This reality has
existed since Leon, which recognized that the deterrent effect of the
300. Borrowing from the qualified immunity cases, officers are considered to violate
clearly established law when they are aware of the controlling law. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730, 738–39, 741 (2002). Here, the prior misconduct would play the role of clearly establishing
the law. Prior misconduct puts the officer on notice of the possibility of violating the law in the
future.
301. Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see supra note 248.
302. See supra Subsections III.B.1.a–b.
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exclusionary rule affects “the behavior of individual law enforcement
officers or the policies of their departments.”303 The language
“recurring or systemic negligence” can lead to even deeper inquiries
into past acts or patterns of unconstitutional action.304
In practice, this would mean that courts might be required to
evaluate an ongoing police department practice distinct from the actual
police–citizen encounter in court.305 How else might a court determine
whether the constitutional violation was isolated or recurring, but to
examine past practices and current policy? Though courts may be
reluctant to undertake this inquiry, defense lawyers should challenge the
systemic nature of the problem or they will risk losing the exclusionary
remedy. For example, a defense lawyer facing an acknowledged
constitutional violation and a prosecutor’s argument that the particular
police officer acted without objective culpability would be remiss in not
trying to paint the constitutional violation as either a failure to train or a
systemic failure.306 To be clear, this would not be in the context of a
constitutional tort suit, but in the ordinary Fourth Amendment
suppression hearing.
As discussed, recent lawsuits in New York City concerning the
NYPD stop-and-frisk practices present a good example of the potential
disruption this inquiry could bring. Between 2005 and June 2008, 88%
of the 775,428 individuals stopped were neither cited nor arrested.307 In
303. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (emphasis added).
304. Laurin, supra note 17, at 684 (in critiquing Herring, “[N]o prior decision had held that
evidence of departmental policies or other systemic circumstances that undermined Fourth
Amendment compliance, standing alone, and in the absence of individual law enforcement
misconduct, justify granting suppression”); Wayne R. LaFave, supra note 17, at 784
(recognizing that the Supreme Court has never before used the term “systemic negligence”).
305. Cf. David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights Cases to Reform Racially Biased
Criminal Justice Practices, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 102–06 (2007) (detailing racially
biased police department practices); David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of
Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1236–37 (detailing the
difficulty in requiring a plaintiff to establish a police department policy of choking citizens in
order to have an injunction granted against the department).
306. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989) (“[T]he inadequacy of police
training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
contact. . . . Only where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a
municipality—a ‘policy’ as defined by our prior cases—can a city be liable for such a failure
under § 1983.”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (limiting municipal
liability to unconstitutional policy or custom). But see Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Congress Needs to
Repair the Court’s Damage to § 1983, 16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 29, 51 (2010) (discussing why
“plaintiffs may want to hold supervisors personally responsible for the actions of their
subordinates” rather than rely on a city policy to sue the municipality).
307. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, RACIAL DISPARITY IN NYPD STOPS-AND-FRISKS:
THE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRELIMINARY REPORT ON UF-250 DATA FROM 2005
THROUGH JUNE 2008 1, 10, 15 (Jan. 15, 2009), http://ccrjustice.org/files/Report-CCR-NYPD-
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less than 2% of the frisks was a weapon recovered.308 Based on data
collected between 2004 and 2009, “877,080 stops, or 31.2% of all stops
citywide, [were] unjustified or of undeterminable legality.”309 So,
imagine a typical suppression hearing involving the recovery of a
weapon after an unconstitutional stop and frisk. Under a culpabilitycentered exclusionary rule, the court would have to consider the
knowledge and experience of the particular officer and then evaluate
whether this unconstitutional frisk was part of a systemic pattern. Does
this data support a recurring, systemic problem of stopping people
without reasonable suspicion? Is it fair for the judge to take into account
the actions of other officers in determining the objective culpability of
this particular officer? How should courts incorporate the stated policies
of the police department or government and the custom and practice that
encourages these stops? What weight would this information have on
determining the objective culpability of the officer or the department?
None of these questions has an easy answer, yet all are potentially
raised in the most basic of Fourth Amendment stops.
As another example of the difference that a culpability-centered
analysis might bring, the Ligon lawsuit on stop-and-frisk practices
revealed that a training video on the definition of a Fourth Amendment
seizure incorrectly stated the law.310 As this training video had been
shown in almost every precinct and to almost every patrol officer, this
systemic error in legal instruction could affect thousands of police
stops.311 Should such a systemic misinstruction to all police officers be
enough to demonstrate a systemic problem warranting exclusion? While
this information was introduced into evidence as part of the civil
lawsuit, arguably, these facts are now admissible in suppression
hearings as they provide a necessary avenue for defense counsel to
show a non-isolated example of negligence.312
While taxing on the trial courts now responsible for litigating larger
police-policy issues in suppression hearings, this new practice might
have a positive impact on reforming certain areas of police practice.
Civil tort principles will be litigated within suppression hearings, with
the result that some practices may be deemed unconstitutional. This
Stop-and-Frisk.pdf.
308. Id. at 11–12.
309. Declaration of Jeffrey Fagan at 2, Floyd v. City of N.Y., No. 08-cv-01034 (SAS)
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011); see also NYPD Stop and Frisk - the Numbers and the Impact, CTR.
FOR CONST. RTS., www.stopandfrisk.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
310. Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 534–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (detailing a
series of errors in police training videos and materials involving the Fourth Amendment).
311. See id. at 534.
312. Since the Supreme Court’s language in Herring and Davis focused on “non-isolated
negligence,” this type of systemic error will now be the focus of suppression hearings (rather
than being confined to civil lawsuits). See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
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outcome is similar to the practice of founding era Fourth Amendment
tort suits, which predated the rise of the exclusionary rule.313 Of course,
from another perspective, this new focus will merely distract from the
relevant issues surrounding the particular stop being litigated.
6. Expanded Discovery
To facilitate the inquiry of recurring or systemic negligence—in this
case meaning prior constitutional violations—new avenues of discovery
might now be open for lawyers investigating the issue.314 The
information about the New York City stops was developed from
litigation by civil rights groups suing the city.315 To determine systemic
negligence, litigants will need access to a host of new information

313. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 785–
800 (1994) (discussing the Founding-era practice of civil tort suits as the primary remedy for
Fourth Amendment violations).
314. See David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 455, 496 n.242 (1999) (recognizing that “[p]olice personnel files including police reports of
prior incidents have been held to be discoverable in cases where the defendant is accused of
violence against a police officer and the defendant is asserting self-defense”); see id. (“Police
personnel files have been held to be properly discoverable for an in camera inspection to find
impeachment material in non-violent criminal cases.”); Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Accused’s
Right to Discovery or Inspection of Records of Prior Complaints Against, or Similar Personnel
Records of, Peace Officer Involved in the Case, 86 A.L.R.3d 1170, 1175 (1978) (“Within the
cases in which a defendant, charged with an offense involving violence against a peace officer
alleged by the defendant to have been the aggressor, sought discovery or inspection of the
officer’s personnel records, such disclosure has occasionally been totally disallowed but usually
has been at least partially allowed, either in the form of in camera inspection by or in the
presence of the trial judge or in the form of direct disclosure to the defendant.” (footnotes
omitted)).
315. See supra note 237 (discussing the federal lawsuits in New York City). This
information will not be available in other cities, and only involves one aspect of the problem.
Observing how similar discovery requests have been litigated in § 1983 lawsuits, however,
provides some clues as to how this process will evolve. See, e.g., Ryan v. Bd. of Police
Comm’rs, 96 F.3d 1076, 1084 (8th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging the availability of discovery and
the importance of meeting discovery demands in a police misconduct case); Wolfe v. Green,
257 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.W. Va. 2009) (requiring police to provide requested documents);
King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 195–96 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (allowing discovery of police
records); Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp. 1090, 1115 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (“Under § 1983, the
extent of supervisors’ knowledge of and participation in the acts of their subordinates
determines the scope of their liability and ipso facto the municipality’s liability. The essence of
plaintiff’s complaint is that the supervisory defendants were grossly negligent or deliberately
indifferent in failing to provide adequate training, supervision and discipline to officers on the
police force . . . . To prove this allegation, the court agrees with plaintiff that it would be high
[sic] relevant, indeed critical, to establish what the defendants knew regarding allegations of
police brutality and when they knew it.”). See generally MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE
MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 8:1–8:15 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing discovery
considerations for § 1983 lawsuits against police officers).
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sources.316 First, litigants will need data on the particular officer
involved.317 This will involve data on past stops, citizen complaints,
internal police complaints, disciplinary reports, civil lawsuits, and
maybe even past legal determinations.318 Second, as a systemic matter,
litigants will need data on the number of constitutional violations in the
jurisdiction, which would include those formally found by the court,
those informally discovered by the prosecutors, and those litigated in
successful civil rights actions.319 In addition, for courts to evaluate a
reasonable officer’s knowledge about constitutional rights (to determine
deliberate or reckless action), they will need documentation about
training programs, standards of conduct, and accountability mechanisms
in the jurisdiction.320
As might be imagined, this additional information will be
burdensome to produce for a criminal suppression hearing. In addition,
it will require extensive litigation before admission. Yet under a
culpability-centered standard, this inquiry appears to be permissible.
Police officers are repeat players in the criminal justice system as they
make hundreds of stops a year and leave a significant paper trail about
these contacts.321 Individually and collectively, this data will now be
316. Cf. Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 973 (3d Cir. 1996) (allowing recurring
pattern of excessive force claims to be presented to the jury); Vann v. City of N.Y., 72 F.3d
1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (“To prove such deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that
the need for more or better supervision to protect against constitutional violations was
obvious. . . . An obvious need may be demonstrated through proof of repeated complaints of
civil rights violations; deliberate indifference may be inferred if the complaints are followed by
no meaningful attempt on the part of the municipality to investigate or to forestall further
incidents.” (citations omitted)).
317. Interestingly, New York City and Philadelphia have been collecting that data as a
result of existing settlements with plaintiffs who sued over police practices. In other
jurisdictions, the rise of crime data analysis has led to new crime data collection methods and
recording systems. Many major metropolitan areas have sophisticated crime-mapping systems
that require the collection of information about each arrest, contact, and police activity. See
Ferguson, supra note 233, at 214–15, 219–20 (discussing New York City’s CompStat program
for collecting empirical data on crime and crime mapping).
318. See G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator’s View of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct
Policy and Practice Cases, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 747, 752–54 (1999) (“The specifics of proof in
discipline cases often require a painstaking gathering and analysis of much detailed evidence
concerning the disciplinary process over a period of several years before and after the incident
in question.”).
319. See, e.g., Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S.
Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 3
(2003) (discussing an investigation by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice in response to fifteen young black men being shot and killed by the Cincinnati Police
Department over a six-year period in the 1960s).
320. All of this data exists. The issue is requiring police and prosecutors to provide it at the
request of defense counsel challenging a particular stop.
321. See Stuntz, supra note 283, at 896.
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subject to discovery and litigation.
7. Experts: A Reasonable Police Officer Standard
Experts on police training and knowledge may also now be needed
in suppression hearings.322 In a traditional suppression hearing focused
on the constitutional violation, there was no real place for an expert
opinion on how a reasonable officer would have acted.323 Judges have
been and are perfectly capable of determining existing constitutional
standards and whether the Constitution was violated. However, if the
inquiry is now how the particular officer’s actions compare to a
reasonable officer’s actions, then new information sources about the
reasonable officer standard are required.324
One can easily imagine that in any suppression hearing in which a
court must determine objectively culpable wrongdoing, both sides will
hire experts to testify about what a reasonable police officer would do
and why the other side is wrong.325 These experts could be former
police officers or current criminologists who might explain why a
certain action or certain way of thinking rises to the level of culpable
322. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (discussing expert testimony); Geoffrey P. Alpert, Effective
Use of Expert Witnesses in Police Misconduct Cases: The Changing Role of the Expert Witness
(July 2002) (unpublished presentation, Association of Trial Lawyers of America), 2 Ann. 2002
ATLA-CLE 1817 (“To show a mistake or wrongdoing that is negligent or even grossly
negligent, an expert can evaluate the actions of the officer and other people and determine
whether the behavior did or did not comply with proper standards or practices.”).
323. See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 155–56 (4th Cir. 2006); Young v.
City of Providence ex rel. Napolitano, 404 F.3d 4, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2005); Alvarado v. Oakland
Cnty., 809 F. Supp. 2d 680, 688–89 (E.D. Mich. 2011); Young v. City of Centreville, 523
N.E.2d 621, 628–29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
324. This may result in the scope of expert testimony that is regularly seen in § 1983 cases
against police officers. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 6.01 (2013) (“A wide variety of experts have testified in § 1983 actions. For
example, experts have described and explained law enforcement operations and correctional
procedures . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); see also Eileen R. Kaufman, Choosing the Insidious
Path: West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey and the Importance of Experts in Civil
Rights Litigation, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 57, 61 (1991–1992) (“There is no serious
dispute that experts are an essential expense when litigating civil rights cases.”).
325. See AVERY ET AL., supra note 315, at § 11:15 (“The use of expert testimony regarding
proper police practices is now regularly entertained by the courts. The number of retired police
administrators, criminologists, and other professionals with expertise who are willing to testify
in police misconduct cases is growing rapidly and these experts are available in most sections of
the country.”); Alpert, supra note 322 (“[A]n expert can rely on ‘national standards’ as
published by membership organizations (e.g., International Association of Chiefs of Police,
Police Executive Research Forum), the agency’s own policy, or policies in surrounding
jurisdictions. Similarly, training materials from national, local, or regional outlets can be used to
establish standards. Once the expert has developed the standard by which an officer should act,
the expert can evaluate the officer’s behavior in its proper context, come to a conclusion about
the level of “negligence” or “recklessness,” and determine if these actions were a proximate
cause of the injury.”).
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action.326 Obviously, like the practice of experts in civil contexts, both
sides would likely call conflicting experts.327 These experts might
further open the door for additional discovery, similar to the role of the
expert in other legal contexts. As police departments and practices are
localized, there would be questions of local practices versus national
practices as well as a question of how to find objective benchmarks to
evaluate the rather messy reality of modern police–citizen encounters.328
While most judges would consider such expert testimony unnecessary,
it would be far more relevant under the new rule than under the
traditional exclusionary rule.
8. Establishing Deterrence on the Record
The core logic underlying Hudson, Herring, and Davis involves the
importance of deterrence.329 If a particular act of exclusion will deter
future violations, then it follows that the evidence should be
excluded.330 Usually, the deterrence rationale focuses on general
deterrence, but it can also involve specific acts of deterrence.331 In
particular, the focus of specific deterrence may lead to a new line of
questioning in this two-tier suppression context.
For defense counsel this might necessitate a change in tactics to
establish on the record that an acknowledged constitutional wrong
might deter this particular officer from such wrongdoing in the future.
As an example, assume that the trial court has found a Fourth
Amendment violation (first tier), and the parties are now arguing about
326. AVERY ET AL., supra note 315, § 11:15 (“An expert may be called to testify about a
wide variety of police practices. Whether municipalities have provided proper training to
officers, whether supervisors have properly reviewed prior complaints of misconduct, and
whether the policies of a department with respect to supervision and discipline are proper are
probably best litigated with the use of experts.”); Taylor, supra note 318, at 752 (“Often, a
police expert, either a sympathetic local (ex) police official, or one who specializes in police
misconduct cases, may be required to help interpret and evaluate the evidence, both for
plaintiff’s counsel, and, later, for the jury.”).
327. See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 34–39 (2000) (discussing the historical development of using expert
witnesses to represent both sides).
328. See generally AVERY ET AL., supra note 315, § 11:15 (“The utility of expert testimony
in understanding police operations is evident from the training which police officers themselves
are given to prepare them for their jobs. In all responsibly managed police departments, officers
are required to undergo specialized training before they are assigned to street patrol. The need
for sophisticated and thorough training is well recognized.”).
329. See supra Part I.
330. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (“By refusing to admit evidence gained
as a result of [unconstitutional] conduct, the courts hope to instill,” both in “particular
investigating officers” and “in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the
rights of an accused.”).
331. Id.
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the level of objective culpability of the particular officer (second tier).
Defense counsel asks the officer whether he would knowingly violate
the Fourth Amendment. The officer responds, “No, of course not.”
Defense counsel then asks, “You know that the court found your actions
in this case violated the Fourth Amendment.” The officer says, “Yes.”
Then, defense counsel finishes by asking, “Knowing what the court held
about your actions, would you knowingly violate the Constitution
again?” Presumably, the officer would answer that he would not violate
the Constitution in the future, and the defense could argue that this
officer has been specifically deterred from future constitutional
violations. Deterrence, normally a speculative concept, has been proven
on the record.
Getting an officer to admit on cross-examination that: (a) he or she
would not purposely violate the Fourth Amendment; (b) he or she
understands that his or her actions did violate the Fourth Amendment;
and (c) if faced with the same circumstance, he or she would not repeat
the error, removes the case from the Herring–Davis logic of deterrence.
A trial court could not simply rely on a lack of objective culpability if
the principle of specific deterrence would apply in the particular case
(because it could be proved that the officer would, in fact, be deterred in
the future). In simple terms, if one can prove specific deterrence on the
record, one can avoid a generalized culpability inquiry by the court.
9. Seeking New Remedies
The Supreme Court’s decoupling of constitutional violations and the
remedy of suppression does not necessarily mean that constitutional
violations will go unremedied.332 While from a defendant’s perspective
suppression of the evidence is usually the preferred choice, it does not
exhaust the options.333 Without exclusion, a court may be willing to
consider other methods of police accountability. One potential remedy
would be to inform the jury of the constitutional violation during
trial.334 The jury would be instructed that the evidence was recovered in
332. See supra Section I.A.
333. Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–98 (2006) (“Citizens and lawyers
are much more willing to seek relief in the courts for police misconduct . . . . The number of
public-interest law firms and lawyers who specialize in civil-rights grievances has greatly
expanded.”), with id. at 611 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“To argue that there may be few civil suits
because violations may produce nothing ‘more than nominal injury’ is to confirm, not to deny,
the inability of civil suits to deter violations.”).
334. See, e.g., Elizabeth N. Dewar, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE
L.J. 1450, 1452, 1459 (2006) (proposing jury instructions for Brady violations, which are
triggered when prosecutors fail to turn over favorable information to defense counsel); Cynthia
E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence, 100
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 416, 422 (2010) (suggesting a jury instruction for a Brady
violation as a punitive sanction); Cynthia E. Jones, The Right Remedy for the Wrongly
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violation of the Constitution.335 In this way, the negligence of the officer
would be aired in court, but it would not result in exclusion of the
evidence.
Similar instructions on missing evidence or other government errors
are regularly given to juries deciding cases.336 In most cases, the fact
that a constitutional violation occurred in obtaining evidence will have
no direct effect on the verdict. In some cases, however, the police
officer’s actions might affect credibility determinations. In others, the
violation might affect the weight given to the prosecution’s evidence.
The justification for this instruction is not to invite the jury to punish
the officer but to provide a clear and formal consequence for
governmental wrongdoing. A prosecutor will have to address an
unpleasant fact that weakens the case, which itself is a deterrent.337
In addition, if the argument against the exclusionary rule is that it
undermines the truth-seeking nature of trial, this truthful admission of a
constitutional violation will serve that larger interest.338 The
Constitution has been violated. Acknowledging that fact in open court
serves several process-oriented goals, including a measure of personal
and community accountability for the offending officer.339
Convicted: Judicial Sanctions for Destruction of DNA Evidence, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2893,
2948 (2009) (“In addition to excluding forensic evidence, a new trial sanction could also include
a strongly worded adverse inference or ‘missing evidence’ instruction.”).
335. This could be done during jury instructions or during closing argument.
336. See, e.g., One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Broad. Dev. Grp., Inc., 147 Fed. App’x 535, 540
(6th Cir. 2005) (“Under Kentucky law, a missing evidence instruction . . . is appropriate when
there exists a genuine question of fact as to whether one party negligently destroyed or lost
evidence relevant to an essential element of an opposing party’s case.”); Niehus v. Liberio, 973
F.2d 526, 529–30 (7th Cir. 1992) (allowing a missing-evidence instruction in a police
misconduct lawsuit); United States v. Steve, Nos. 89-3223, 89-3224, 1990 WL 194509, at *2
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (“When the prosecutor loses or leaves behind important evidence, the trial
court may find sanctions in order or a ‘missing evidence’ instruction warranted, i.e., a charge
that the jury may infer that the missing evidence would have been unfavorable to the
government. Relevant considerations for the trial judge, in deciding what action to take when
the government fails to preserve evidence, include ‘the degree of negligence or bad faith
involved, the importance of the evidence lost, and the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.’”
(quoting United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 648, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1971))); State v.
Fulminante, 975 P.2d 75, 93 (Ariz. 1999) (“When police negligently fail to preserve potentially
exculpatory evidence, an instruction . . . permits the jury to infer that the evidence would have
been exculpatory.”).
337. As the Hudson majority was concerned with finding other methods of accountability
short of suppression, this truth-oriented instruction may serve the needs of both accountability
and truth. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597–99.
338. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988) (“The very integrity of the judicial
system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the
framework of the rules of evidence.”).
339. Recording and formalizing this admission of constitutional error will also make it
easier for future litigants to prove a recurring pattern of negligence (which is now one of the
considerations post Herring-Davis).
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10. Litigating Attenuation
The final issue is how to address the Supreme Court’s attenuation
discussion in Hudson.340 Justice Scalia’s focus on “interest attenuation”
requires an evaluation of the underlying interests protected by the
violated constitutional right.341 Lower courts have remained remarkably
silent on the issue, perhaps confused as to how one would evaluate
constitutional interests.342 Scholars that attempt to address the possible
ramifications generally signal alarm.343 Yet the puzzle of litigating the
issue remains.
For example, consider again a court confronted with the
unconstitutional stop and questioning of the two individuals in the
NYPD cases. What is the purpose of Terry v. Ohio, such that
contraband recovered after an unconstitutional stop can be evaluated? Is
it security, privacy, or dignity?344 All of these purposes are in some
measure part of the Fourth Amendment’s protection on the streets.345
But how would these interests be determined in litigation? Further, as
Professor Davies has argued, depending on one’s view of the interests
protected by Miranda, many of the traditional Miranda protections
could be circumvented by simply redefining the interests.346 Broadly
speaking, if the interests underlying a constitutional right were at issue
in every suppression hearing, courts would be forced to evaluate
significant constitutional theories even in ordinary suppression hearings.
340. See supra Section II.C.
341. A precursor argument for attenuation can be seen in arguments like those of Chief
Justice Burger in Brewer v. Williams, in which he argued that the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment would not be furthered by suppression of evidence. 430 U.S. 387, 426 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“In any event, the fundamental purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to
safeguard the fairness of the trial and the integrity of the factfinding process. In this case, where
the evidence of how the child’s body was found is of unquestioned reliability, and since the
Court accepts Williams’ disclosures as voluntary and uncoerced, there is no issue either of
fairness or evidentiary reliability to justify suppression of truth. It appears suppression is
mandated here for no other reason than the Court’s general impression that it may have a
beneficial effect on future police conduct; indeed, the Court fails to say even that much in
defense of its holding.” (footnote omitted)).
342. See, e.g., United States v. Elmore, 692 F. Supp. 2d 915, 922 (E.D. Tenn. 2010)
(discussing three different cases in the Sixth Circuit in which the court did not find attenuation
to be a convincing reason to avoid suppression).
343. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 215, at 1233–35; Tomkovicz, supra note 50, at 394–95;
Tomkovicz, supra note 71, at 1828–30.
344. See supra notes 204–06 and accompanying text.
345. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968) (“The Fourth Amendment provides that ‘the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .’ This inestimable right of
personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner
closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs.” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. IV)).
346. Davies, supra note 215, at 1233–35.
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Litigants would be advised to argue for a conception of the
constitutional right that fits their client’s interest. Perhaps as part of a
motion to suppress (or a responsive motion), an argument will need to
be crafted establishing the constitutional interests protected. Though this
step was unnecessary in traditional suppression hearings, it is now
incumbent upon lawyers to create the link between the interest protected
by the constitutional protection and suppression of evidence. For
example, in a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing, a crossexamination should include questioning the officer about why certain
constitutional restraints exist, how officers are trained on reasonable
expectations of privacy, and how officers know that violation of such
legal protections would warrant suppression. These arguments will
likely be contested and will need to be part of the record developed by
the parties. Courts will be in an even more delicate position of trying to
divine the interests protected by the various constitutional protections
knowing that any constitutional conclusions will be subject to appellate
review.
CONCLUSION: CONCERNS FOR THE FUTURE
On the ground, constitutional changes take time to take hold.
Sweeping pronouncements that redefine constitutional concepts can
sometimes remain ignored in practice. The Supreme Court has taken the
first steps to redefine the exclusionary rule. How litigants answer the
questions in this Article will determine the next steps.
The concerns with applying the new exclusionary rules are both
practical and substantive. Practically, a two-tiered suppression hearing
analysis requires additional inputs to determine the level of culpability.
Even if it does not change the ultimate outcome of suppression, it will
change the process. This, in turn, will mean additional work for trial
courts and additional strategic decisions for lawyers. Defense counsel
will be wise to consider whether this new culpability focus opens new
avenues for cross-examination, discovery, and expert testimony.
Prosecutors will be wise to limit the scope of this discovery and to
prepare their officers for an additional culpability-based crossexamination. Police departments will be required to collect more
information about possible systemic problems and to develop standards
for a “reasonable police officer.”
Substantively, the changes will narrow the reach of the exclusionary
rule. Whether good or bad from a policy perspective, it is a significant
change. One can imagine that such a system may incentivize courts to
find no constitutional violation in order to avoid a lengthy culpability
inquiry. Alternatively, a bifurcated process could develop such that
culpability litigation only occurs after a finding of constitutional
wrongdoing, much like a penalty phase in a capital punishment trial.
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Any prediction of the future of the exclusionary rule must be based
on the past pattern of cases. As discussed, the Supreme Court has made
clear that the exclusionary rule is no longer an automatic remedy. What
replaces it and how to determine when it should be applied is the
challenge for judges and lawyers on the ground. Lower courts have
already begun addressing these questions with mixed results.347
While the pure Herring–Davis case has not yet emerged, it soon
will. When it does, litigants and judges will have to start defining some
of the terms offered by the Supreme Court. Creative litigants will begin
pushing the boundaries of discovery and investigating deliberate and
systemic problems. Perhaps this will open up new methods of police
accountability involving the collection of new data about constitutional
violations. Or, perhaps more likely, this change will functionally
eviscerate the traditional exclusion remedy as overburdened defense
lawyers and public defenders will be unable to litigate systemic issues
in individual cases. Courts will also have to interpret the Supreme
Court’s intent in including ill-defined new culpability standards into the
exclusionary rule. How far trial courts will go to litigate culpability is
unclear, but the first step is to answer the questions in this Article.

347. See Claire Angelique et al., What Herring Hath Wrought: An Analysis of Post-Herring
Cases in the Federal Courts, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 231–33 (2011).

